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NOMENCLATURE  
 
AML = Anti-Money Laundering 
 
FMU = Financial Monitoring Unit  
 
CDD = Customer Due Diligence 
 
CFT = Combating Financing of Terrorism 
 
FATF = Financial Action Task Force 
 
IMF = International Monetary Fund 
 
KYC = Know your Customer 
 
ML 
 
= Money Laundering 
PEP = Politically Exposed Person 
 
RBA = Risk Based Approach 
 
SAR = Suspicious Activity Reporting 
 
TF = Terrorist Financing 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) emphasises on Risk-Based Approach (RBA) so that 
regulated entities can respond Money Laundering (ML) and Terrorist Financing (TF) threats in 
ways that are proportionate to the risks involved. However, the RBA suffers from several 
difficulties and this has resulted in its ineffective implementation. This paper discusses practical 
conditions such as implementation challenges, unintentional regulatory breaches and their 
consequence, in carrying out RBA and agrees that ‘uncertainty-based approach’ is effective to 
the extent of Suspicious Activity Report (SAR).  
 
Moreover, this paper suggests that the FATF needs to work together with regulators and 
regulated entities to address RBA’s implementation challenges and provide technical 
assistance rather than imposing hefty penalties and sanction.1 
 
  KEY WORDS 
 
Anti-Money Laundering; Customer Due Diligence; Combating Financing of Terrorism; Financial 
Action Task Force; Know your Customer; Money Laundering; Risk Based Approach; 
Suspicious Activity Reporting; Terrorist Financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 Lishan Ai, ‘Rule-based but risk-oriented” approach for combating money laundering in Chinese financial sectors’ (2012) 15 (2) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 198 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND ISSUE 
 
In 1990, an inexperienced, one-year task force published 40 vague and voluntary 
recommendations for building an international Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating 
Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regime.2 However, during the thirty years of its formation3, FATF 
has become the focal institution of a powerful financial governance regime. Now countries rely 
on FATF’s tools to counter crimes of all kinds, including but not limited to transnational 
organised crime for example money laundering, terrorism, and weapons proliferation.4 FATF’s 
Recommendations cover the criminal justice system and law enforcement, international co-
operation, and the financial system and its regulation.5 
In its beginning, the AML framework was static, obliging regulated entities to report transactions 
according to fixed parameters or thresholds specified (rule-based) by the law.6 However, the 
rule-based system was soon perceived as too costly, inflexible and ineffective7 in the fast-
moving and complex sectors.8 Therefore, the prescriptive nature of the rule-based approach to 
AML compliance and the exponential growth of Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) and 
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) resulting from the use of 'tick-box' method led to the adoption 
of RBA to prevent Money Laundering and combat Terrorist Financing.9  
                                                          
2 Susan Strange, Mad money When markets outgrow governments (The University of Michigan Press 1998) 
 
3 FATF, ‘Remarks by FATF President Marshall Billingslea’ < https//www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/speech-fatf-ministerial.html> accessed 30 June 2019 
 
4 Mark T Nane, ‘Re-thinking FATF an experimentalist interpretation of the Financial Action Task Force’ (2018) 69 (2) Crime, 
Law and Social Change 131 
 
5 Jackie Johnson, ‘Third round FATF mutual evaluations indicate declining compliance (2008) 11 (1) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 47 
 
6 Carsten Ullrich, ‘A risk-based approach towards infringements prevention on the internet adopting the anti-money laundering 
framework to online platforms’ (2018) 26 (3) International Journal of Law and Information Technology 226 
 
7 Lishan Ai and Jun Tang, ‘Risk-based Approach for Designing Enterprise-wide AML Information System Solution’ (2011) 18 
Journal of Financi al Crime 268 
 
8 Carsten Ullrich, ‘A risk-based approach towards infringements prevention on the internet adopting the anti-money laundering 
framework to online platforms’ (2018) 26 (3) International Journal of Law and Information Technology 226 
 
9 Abdullahi Usman Bello and Jackie Harvey, ‘From a risk-based to an uncertainty-based approach to anti-money laundering 
compliance’ (2017) 30 (1) Security Journal 24 
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Hence, today a central element in contemporary AML/ CFT strategies is the idea that regulatory 
efforts should be risk-based.10 In order to comply with FATF standards, most of jurisdictions 
has established FATF compliant legislation and incorporated risk-based concept in statutory 
definition and mechanisms. However, the reality is that RBA’s implementation suffers from 
several challenges.11 Such as excessive human intervention, expensive name screening 
systems, arbitrary risk categorisation, inappropriate Customer Due Diligence (CDD), lacking 
well skilled and trained personnel12, particularly in the absence of definition of ‘Risk’ and 
‘suspicion’ in AML/CFT regime has resulted in its ineffective implementation. 
In order to address aforesaid challenges some scholars articulate that merely RBA is not 
enough and therefore, suggests that AML/CFT regime need to adopt risk-based but risk-
oriented13 approach. Another school of thought argue that an “uncertainty- based approach” 
will provide a better representation of the decision-making process followed by regulated 
entities.14 Ultimately, both schools of thought propose firstly, implement AML/CFT regulation 
keeping in mind countries own conditions’, improve better concept of AML/CFT risk and align 
the interest of the regulated entities’ with the regulators without the need for fines and other 
pressures.15  
1.2 METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper is based on the doctrinal and theoretical method to examine the characteristics of 
risk as it applies to AML/CFT strategy.16 However, in order to highlight implementation 
                                                          
 
10 Stuart Ross, Michelle Hannan, ‘Money laundering regulation and risk‐based decision-making’ (2007) 10(1) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 106 
 
11 Anna Simonova, ‘The risk‐based approach to anti‐money laundering problems and solutions’ (2011) 14 (4) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 346 
 
12 Lishan Ai, John Broome and Hao Yan, ‘Carrying out a risk‐based approach to AML in China partial or full implementation?’ 
(2010) 13(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 394 
 
13 Lishan Ai, ‘Rule-based but risk-oriented” approach for combating money laundering in Chinese financial sectors’ (2012) 15 
(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 198 
 
14 Abdullahi Usman Bello and Jackie Harvey, ‘From a risk-based to an uncertainty-based approach to anti-money laundering 
compliance’ (2017) 30 (1) Security Journal 24 
 
15 Ibid 
 
16 Abdullahi Usman Bello and Jackie Harvey, ‘From a risk-based to an uncertainty-based approach to anti-money laundering 
compliance’ (2017) 30 (1) Security Journal 24 
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challenges, this paper illustrates incidents and cases to highlight the vulnerabilities of the 
regulated entities which cause ineffective AML/CFT regime.  
1.3 STRUCTURE 
 
This paper comprises of six chapters (including introduction and conclusion). Chapter 2 is 
introduction and gives an overview of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (international 
organization) along with its history, background and standards to build the arguments, ‘why 
FATF consider that Risk-Based Approach (RBA) is a better approach to respond ML/TF’ risk. 
Chapter 3 discusses potential risks and impact of Money Laundering (ML) and Terrorist 
Financing (TF) on the international financial system and economy.  It further discusses that, in 
order to prevent financial system, the regulated entities are obligate to comply with AML/CFT 
regulations otherwise breach may bring sever consequences such as civil penalties and 
criminal prosecutions. Chapter 4 analyses the doctrine namely; uncertainty-based approach17 
and derives that traditional theories of risk are not easily transferable to the arena of AML and 
CFT,18 especially when RBA based on decision making process and outcome of decision is 
uncertain. Chapter 5 examines the attributes of CDD and particularly challenges faces by 
regulated entities to identify a prospective customer and suggest how different way of thinking 
to the problem of detecting and controlling money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing 
successfully adopted.19 And finally Chapter 6 concludes and outlines a possible alternative 
proposition for example; (1) place coordination and collaboration requirement for the 
supervisors in FATF recommendation and (2) Penalty and sanction should not be imposed on 
the out-come of decision but on the weak AML/CFT framework. 
 
  
                                                          
17 Ibid 
 
18 ibid 
 
19 Stuart Ross, Michelle Hannan, ‘Money laundering regulation and risk‐based decision-making’ (2007) 10(1) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 106 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF) AND RISK-BASED REGIMES 
 
2.1 ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING (AML) AND COMBATING FINANCING OF 
TERRORISM (CFT) REGIMES 
  
The international community, including the United Nations and other international organisations 
such as the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and regional 
development banks, together with the FATF and FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs), plays 
a key role in combating money laundering and in developing strategies and guidelines for 
monitoring national compliance.20 Coupled with private sector expert groups such as the 
Wolfsberg and Egmont Groups and national institutions including financial regulators, and 
legislative and judicial bodies, international efforts to prevent financial and predicated crimes 
require a complex and coordinated commitment from multiple actors.21  
2.2 THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF) 
 
FATF is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1989 on the initiative of the G7 (Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States) to develop policies to 
combat money laundering.22  
2.3 FATF’S RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARDS PREVENTION OF FINANCIAL CRIME 
 
Initially, FATF had the responsibility of examining money laundering techniques and trends, 
reviewing the actions which had already been undertaken at a national or international level, 
and setting out the measures that still needed to be taken to combat money laundering.23  
However, after passage of time its responsibilities has expended and now FATF is responsible 
for setting standards and promoting effective implementation of legal, regulatory and 
                                                          
20 Willy Zapata Sagastume, Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid and Stefanie Garry, ‘Money Laundering and Financial Risk Management 
in Latin America, with Special Reference to Mexico’ (2016) 44 < 
http//economiatyp.uam.mx/index.php/ETYP/article/view/238/343> accessed 30 August 2019 
 
21 Ibid 
 
22 Usman W Chohan, ‘The FATF in the Global Financial Architecture Challenges and Implications’ (2019) Centre for Aerospace 
& Security Studies (CASS) Paper EC001UC < https//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3362167&download=yes> 
accessed 29 June 2019 
 
23 ibid 
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operational measures to prevent ML, combat TF and other related threats to the integrity of the 
international financial system.24  It also monitors countries and reviews ML and TF techniques 
(typologies), counter-measures and promotes the adoption and implementation of the FATF 
Recommendations globally.25  
2.4 RISK-BASED APPROACH: HISTORY AND BACK GROUND 
 
In April 1990 the FATF issued a report containing a set of Forty Recommendations, which were 
intended to provide a comprehensive plan of action needed to fight against money laundering.26 
However, following the 9/11 terror attacks, in 2001 FATF issued eight special standards27 on 
CFT in addition to the forty Recommendations,28 which are subsequently comprehensively 
revised in 2003.29  
Thereafter, in October 2004 the FATF published a Ninth Special Recommendation, further 
strengthening the agreed international standards for combating terrorist financing and together 
called 40+9 recommendations.30 By virtue of 40+9 recommendations countries were obliged to 
(i) ratify and implement UN instruments; (ii) freeze and confiscate terrorist assets; (iii) report 
suspicious transactions related to terrorism; (iv) have international co-operation to implement 
AML and CFT measures; (v) have measure to mitigate risk of remittance, wire transfer, non-
profit organizations and cash courier.31  
The continued evolution of ML/TF techniques led the FATF to revise the standards 
comprehensively in 2012; and they have been expanded to deal with new threats such as the 
financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to be clearer on transparency 
and tougher on corruption.32 The FATF also made nine Special Recommendations of CFT, part 
                                                          
24 FATF, ‘Who we are’ < https//www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ > accessed 29 June 2019 
 
25  FATF, ‘What we do’ < https//www.fatf-gafi.org/about/whatwedo/> accessed 29 June 2019 
 
26 FATF, ‘History of FATF’ < https//www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/> accessed 29 June 2019 
 
27 FATF, ‘IX special recommendation’ < https//www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/ixspecialrecommendations.html> accessed August 30, 2019 
 
28 David Lewis, ‘Counter-Terrorism Financing Summit’ (Bangkok, 8 November 2018) < https//www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/speech-cft-conference-nov-2018.html > accessed 29 June 2019 
 
29 FATF, ‘History of FATF’ < https//www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/> accessed 29 June 2019 
 
30 Ibid 
 
31 FATF, ‘IX special recommendation’ < https//www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/ixspecialrecommendations.html> accessed August 30, 2019 
32 FATF, ‘History of FATF’ < https//www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/> accessed 29 June 2019 
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of the forty.33 After the aforesaid revision FATF’s 40 recommendations set out the essential 
measures that countries should have in place to:34 
i. identify the risks, and develop policies and domestic coordination;35  
ii. pursue money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation;36 
iii. apply preventive measures for the financial sector and other designated sectors;37 
iv. establish powers and responsibilities for the competent authorities (e.g., investigative, 
law enforcement and supervisory authorities) and other institutional measures;38  
v. enhance the transparency and availability of beneficial ownership information of legal 
persons and arrangements;39 and  
vi. facilitate international cooperation.40 
Widely, FATF’s 40 recommendations can be divided into seven Groups41, the following are 
table is comparison between old42 and new FATF’s recommendations. 
GROUP TOPICS 
Old 
Recommendation 
Number 
(2003) 
New 
Recommendation 
Number 
(2012) 
I 
AML/CFT Policies and Coordination  
Assessing risks and applying 
a risk-based approach  
- 1 
                                                          
 
33 David Lewis, ‘Counter-Terrorism Financing Summit’ (Bangkok, 8 November 2018) < https//www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/speech-cft-conference-nov-2018.html > accessed 29 June 2019 
 
34 FATF Recommendation, ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation’ Updated October 2018 < http//www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf> accessed 30 June 2019 
 
35 Ibid 
 
36 Ibid 
 
37 Ibid 
 
38 Ibid 
 
39 Ibid 
 
40 Ibid 
 
41 FATF Recommendation, ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation’ Updated October 2018 < http//www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf> accessed 30 June 2019 
 
42  “R” denotes to ‘recommendation’ and SR is symbolised as ‘special recommendation for CFT column of old recommendation.  
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National cooperation and 
coordination 
R. 33 2 
II 
Money Laundering and Confiscation  
Money laundering offences  R.1 and R. 2 3 
Confiscation and provisional 
measures 
R. 3 4 
III 
Terrorist Financing and Financing of Proliferation 
Terrorist financing offences  SR. II 5 
Targeted financial sanctions 
related to terrorism and 
terrorist financing  
SR. III 6 
Targeted financial sanctions 
related to proliferation  
- 7 
Non-profit organizations SR. VIII 8 
IV 
Financial and Non-Financial Institution Preventative Measures  
Financial institution secrecy 
laws  
R.4 9 
Customer due diligence and 
Record Keeping 
R. 5 and 10 10 and 11 
Additional measures for specific customers and activities  
Politically exposed persons  
R. 6 12 
Correspondent banking  
R. 7 13 
Money or value transfer 
services  SR. VI 14 
New technologies  
R. 8 15 
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Wire transfers  
SR. VII 16 
Reliance, controls and financial groups  
Reliance on third parties   
R. 9 17 
Internal controls and foreign 
branches and subsidiaries   
R. 15 and R. 22 18 
Higher-risk countries  
R. 21 19 
Reporting of suspicious transactions  
Reporting of suspicious 
transactions  
R. 13 and SR. IV 20 
Tipping-off and confidentiality  R. 14 21 
Designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) 
DNFBPs: Customer due 
diligence  
R. 12 22 
DNFBPs: Other measures  R. 16 23 
V 
Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons and 
Arrangements  
Transparency and beneficial 
ownership of legal persons  
R. 33 24 
Transparency and beneficial 
ownership of legal 
arrangements 
R. 34 25 
VI 
Powers and Responsibilities of Competent Authorities and Other 
Institutional Measures  
Regulation and supervision of 
financial institutions  
R. 23 26 
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Powers of supervisors R. 29 27 
Regulation and supervision of 
DNFBPs  
R. 24 28 
Financial intelligence units   R. 26 29 
Responsibilities of law 
enforcement and investigative 
authorities    
R. 27 30 
Powers of law enforcement 
and investigative authorities  
R. 28 31 
Cash couriers  SR. IX 32 
Statistics  R. 32 33 
Guidance and feedback  R. 25 34 
Sanctions R. 17 35 
VII 
International Cooperation  
International instruments  R. 35 and SRI 36 
Mutual legal assistance  R. 36 & SRV 37 
Mutual legal assistance 
regarding freezing and 
confiscation  
R. 38 38 
Extradition  R. 39 39 
Other forms of international 
cooperation 
R. 39 40 
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The FATF Standards have been revised to strengthen the requirements for higher risk 
situations, and to allow countries to take a more focused approach in areas where high risks 
remain, or implementation could be enhanced.43 Therefore, countries are required; first identify, 
assess and understand ML/TF risks that they face, and then adopt appropriate measures to 
mitigate the risk.44 The risk-based approach allows countries, within the framework of the FATF 
requirements, to adopt a more flexible set of measures, in order to target their resources more 
effectively and apply preventive measures that are commensurate to the nature of risk, in order 
to focus their effort in the most effective manner.45  
2.5 FATF’s RISK-BASED GUIDANCE 
 
FATF has so far issued four rounds of updated and adjusted RBA guidance46, which are 
subsequently being introduced into national laws by its member countries and beyond.47 These 
RBA guidance, not only are traditional credit and financial institutions, but it also applies to 
Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) for example securities 
companies, casinos, real estate agents, legal professionals, accounting professionals, trust and 
company service providers, virtual assets and virtual asset services providers,  life insurance, 
money and value transfer services, prepaid cards, mobile payments and internet-based 
payment services, dealers in precious metal and stones48 (here-in-after called ‘regulated 
entities’). Hence, as per FATF’s standards the regulated entities were given obligations and so-
called flexibility to perform their own risk assessment according to their product mix, customer 
base and geographic exposure.49 
2.6 LEGAL MECHANISM OF RISK-BASED APPROACH 
 
 
                                                          
43 FATF Recommendation, ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation’ Updated June 2019 < https//www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf > accessed 15 July 2019 
 
44 Ibid 
 
45 Ibid 
 
46 FATF Risk Based Approach Guidance , ‘The Rational of Risk Based Approach’ (FATF 2019) < https//www.fatf-
gafi.org/documents/riskbasedapproach/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> accessed 30 July 2019 
 
47 FATF, ‘FATF Countries’ < http//www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/> accessed 30 June 2019 
 
48 ibid 
 
49 Stravros Gadinis and Colby Mangels, ‘Collaborative Gatekeepers’ (2016) 73 (2) Washington & Lee Law Review 797 
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FATF has set up afore-stated international standards and subsequently these 
recommendations are being adopted and merged into national laws by its members and 
beyond.50 Hence, by virtue of national and international legislations, regulated entities are 
responsible to identify, assess and take effective action to mitigate their money laundering and 
terrorist financing risks.51  
Interestingly, on one hand RBA entitles the countries to set standards according to their own 
situation52 and recognise that countries have differences in  their legal, operation and financial 
system and unable to set identical standards. Whereas, on the other hand forces to adopt 
FATF’s recommendation without any amendment.53 Consequently, 205 jurisdictions adopted 
FATF’s RBA standards without keeping in mind their own situation and made them part of 
legislation (for example, UK, China, Pakistan and United states whose AML/ CFT regulations 
are replica of each other). This is the reason that more than 60% of the countries failed to meet 
the FATF standards and considered as ‘non- compliant’ and ‘High risk’.54 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
FATF and FSRBs along with other international organization are making effort to craft 
standards and recommendations to prevent the international financial system and society from 
predicated/ designated crimes and ultimately lead to RBA. Interestingly, RBA to allows 
countries, to adopt a flexible set of measures, to target their resources more effectively and 
apply preventive measures that are commensurate to the nature of risks, to focus their efforts 
in the most effective way.55 Whereas, contrary to RBA objective (flexibility), FATF has universal 
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procedure56 to assess the countries’ compliance levels of implementation of its 
recommendations57  rather assess them according to their own situation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
FINANCIAL AND PREDICATED CRIME: THREAT TO ECONOMY  
AND HUMAN SURVIVAL 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the elements, with illustrations, which forced FATF 
and other international bodies, for example; Bank for International Settlement (BIS), European 
Union (EU) and International Monetary Funds (IMF) to set up standards to prevent international 
financial system from the predicated and designated crimes. Since, ML and TF possess high 
risk as they are not only capable of damaging the international financial system and economy 
and hence human survival. This chapter defines ML/TF and then analyses the protentional risk 
it carries for international financial system, which caused to craft RBA legislations. Whereas, 
RBA has several implementation complexities and challenges as discuss chapter 3 and 4.  
3.2 MONEY LAUNDERING (ML) 
 
ML is one of designated crimes (such as; fraud, smuggling, terrorism, corruption and bribery)58   
and encompasses of three distinct, alternative actus reas: (i) the conversion or transfer, 
knowing that such property is the proceed of crime (ii) the concealment or disguise of the true 
nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to 
property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime; and (iii) the acquisition, 
possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of the receipt, that such property is the 
proceeds of crime.59  
Simply, ML is the criminal practice of processing ill-gotten gains and dirty money through a 
series of transactions, in this way the funds are “cleaned” so that they appear to be proceeds 
from legal activities”.60 Ill-gotten money includes, but is not limited to, illegal arm sales, the 
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illegal sale of wildlife, prostitution, fraud and embezzlement, insider trading and securities fraud, 
bribery and corruption, tax evasion, and siphoning off of aid funds.61 ML is a crime and 
constantly changing in terms of modus operandi and extent of risk involved. Consequently, the 
individuals who are responsible for implementing an effective RBA (here-in-after called 
‘responsible person’) within the regulated entities are required to acquire knowledge and 
constantly upgrade their skills to avoid lapses in decision-making process.  
3.3 STAGES OF MONEY LAUNDERING CYCLE 
 
Money trail is evidence of crime and the money itself is vulnerable to seizure and must be 
protected. Therefore, in order to protect the laundered money, criminals plot diverse and 
complex process62 and amazingly currency is not involved at every stage of the laundering 
process.63 
The process of ML involves dynamic three-stage, namely placement, layering and structuring.64  
                                                          
61 Jackie Johnson, ‘In Pursuit of Dirty Money Identifying Weaknesses in the Global Financial System’ (2001) 5(2) Journal of 
Money Laundering Control 122 
 
62 UNODC, ‘The Money Laundering Cycle’ (United Nation office on Drugs and Crime 2019) < 
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Figure No. 165 (United Nation office on Drugs and Crime) 
The figure No. 1 is an illustration to reveal complex techniques, criminals use to launder money. 
The first and most vulnerable stage of laundering money is “placement”. The goal is to introduce 
the unlawful proceeds into the financial system without attracting the attention of financial 
institutions or law enforcement.66 Placement techniques include structuring currency deposits 
in amounts to evade reporting requirements or commingling currency deposits of legal and 
illegal enterprises.67 For example, dividing large amounts of currency into less-conspicuous 
smaller sums that are deposited directly into a financial institution, depositing a refund check 
from a cancelled vacation package or insurance policy, or purchasing a series of monetary 
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instruments (e.g., cashier’s checks or money orders) that are then collected and deposited into 
accounts at another location or financial institution.68 
Once, criminals succeed to place illicit funds in the financial system, they proceed towards 
layering stage. This stage enables criminals to move funds around the financial system, often 
in a complex series of transactions to create confusion and complicate the paper trail.69 For 
example, exchanging monetary instruments for larger or smaller amounts or wiring or 
transferring funds to and through numerous accounts in one or more financial institutions.70  
Finally, criminals seemingly “clean” funds integrate into streams of economic activity71 by using 
illicit fund to purchase and resale of real estate, investment securities, foreign trusts, or other 
assets. These transactions further shield the criminal from a recorded connection to the funds 
by providing a plausible explanation for the source of the funds.72  
 
Further, e-commerce is vulnerable for ML and usually dirty money integrates by selling 
electronic vouchers on marketplaces or auction sites and conveniently cleans funds transfer in 
the wallet, bank transfer, or is cashed.73 Another method is to convert the money into 
cryptocurrency where it disappears off the radar; once cryptocurrency is sold, the funds from 
the sale become extremely difficult to trace back to the original source.74 
 
As discussed, first stage (placement) of ML is the most vulnerable stage whereby, illicit funds 
may integrate in the financial system. Therefore, it is crucial that regulated entities have RBA 
measures to identify and know the potential customer and prevent their system form criminals, 
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dirty money and/ or illicit transaction. In order to explain risk and impact of criminal activities, 
some real cases illustrate here-in-below. Whereas, practical complications of Customer Due 
Diligence (CDD) and particularly identification of potential customer discuses here-in-below. 
3.4 TERRORIST FINANCING 
  
Terrorist financing involves the solicitation, collection or provision of funds with the intention 
that they may be used to support terrorist acts or organisations. Funds may stem from both 
legal and illicit sources.75 The primary goal of individuals or entities involved in the financing of 
terrorism is not necessarily to conceal the sources of the money but to conceal both the 
financing and the nature of the financed activity.76 Money laundering is only vehicle, by applying 
terrorist groups get access on unlimited money, to compensate fighters and their families; buy 
weapons, food, and fuel; and bribe crooked officials.77 Since, money is the life blood for the 
terrorist and terrorist organization, FATF has emphasised the Transparency and identification 
of beneficial ownership of legal persons78 and arrangements79.  
Overall, ML and TF presents the world community with a complex and dynamic challenge. 
Crime has become increasingly international in scope, and the financial aspects of crime have 
become more complex due to rapid advances in technology and the globalisation of the 
financial services industry80 for example electronic frauds.   
 
3.5 EFFECTS OF MONEY LAUNDERING & TERRORIST FINANCING 
 
Implementation of an effective RBA is essential as ML has potentially devastating economic, 
security, and social consequences. It provides the fuel for drug dealers, terrorists, illegal arms 
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dealers, corrupt public officials, and others to operate and expand their criminal enterprises.81 
For example, a Guinean minister helped a foreign company obtain important mining 
concessions in exchange for $ 8.5 million in bribes. Falsely reporting that money as income 
from consulting work and private land sales, the minister transferred it to the United States and 
bought a luxury estate in New York82, and ill-gotten money conveniently integrated in the 
economy. Regardless, his effort to turn ill-gotten gains into a seemingly legitimate asset was 
ultimately unsuccessful and he was convicted of money laundering83. Timely detection of 
laundering activities is the most challenging aspect in the implementation of an efficient AML 
program as criminals always find newer ways to use financial institutions for illegal activities.84 
The situation is getting alarming, and despite of International standards, guidelines, legislations 
and endless effort of AML/CFT regime; predicated crimes continue to cripple economies, distort 
international finances and harm citizens around the globe.85 ML is a criminal activity against 
governments and countries and threatens national security because of its link with TF86, 
whether because of lingering legal and institutional loopholes or innovation on the part of 
criminals (or both).87  
 
3.5a ECONOMIC DISTORTION AND INSTABILITY 
 
ML has negative impact in the national and international economy, as money launderers are 
not interested in profit generation from their investments but rather in protecting their 
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proceeds.88 Thus they invest their funds in activities that are not necessarily economically 
beneficial to the country where the funds are located.89 For example Mossack Fonseca 
(Pamana)90 has created 214,000 shell companies in the tax heavens making their real owners 
untraceable through public records and hide politicians and public officials and government 
leaders.91  
Furthermore, financial crime redirects funds from sound investments to low-quality investments 
that hide their proceeds, economic growth can suffer.92 In some countries, for example, entire 
industries, such as construction and hotels, have been financed not because of actual demand, 
but because of the short-term interests of money launderers. When these industries no longer 
suit the money launderers, they abandon them, causing a collapse of these sectors and 
immense damage to economies that could ill afford these losses.93 
3.5b LOSS OF CONTROL OF ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
Because of the clandestine nature of money-laundering, it is difficult to estimate the total 
amount of money that goes through the laundry cycle.94 However, no one can deny that the 
world economy is in continuous threat due to huge level of money laundering, for example, in 
2017 estimated amount of worldwide money laundering was from US$500 billion to a 
staggering US$1 trillion.95  Moreover, recently reported that globally estimated amount of 
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money laundered in a year is 2 - 5% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or USD 1.6 to 
USD 4 trillion.96  
Keeping in mind quantum of ML, there is nothing strange that in some emerging market 
countries these illicit proceeds may dwarf government budgets, resulting in a loss of control of 
economic policy by governments. Indeed, in some cases, the sheer magnitude of the 
accumulated asset base of laundered proceeds can be used to corner markets or even small 
economies.97 Further, such a huge amount of ML, is a direct question on effectiveness of RBA 
and there is yet room for changing it approach to fix. 
3.5c UNDERMINING THE INTEGRITY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
Financial institutions that rely on the proceeds of crime have additional challenges in adequately 
managing their assets, liabilities, and operations. For example, large sums of laundered money 
may arrive at a financial institution but then disappear suddenly, without notice, through wire 
transfers in response to non-market factors, such as law enforcement operations.98 This can 
result in liquidity problems and runs on financial institutions.99 Indeed, criminal activity has been 
associated with a number of financial institutions failures around the globe, including the failure 
of the first Internet bank and the European Union Bank.100 Furthermore, some financial crises 
of the 1990s such as the fraud, money laundering, and bribery scandal at BCCI101 and the 1995 
collapse of Barings Bank102 as a risky derivatives scheme carried out by a trader at a subsidiary 
unit had significant criminal or fraud components. Likewise, recently Versobank in Estonia has 
closed-down due to misconduct, misrepresentation and involvement of ML.103 Likewise, 
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another bank, Danske Bank has been ordered to close-up due to money laundering scandal.104 
Amazingly, these collapsed financial institutions were operating in the so-called ‘low risk’ 
countries but this fact indicates that there is some gap between regulators and regulated 
entities. And heavy penalties, strict accountability and sanction is not solution, as discussed in 
Part 4.6 of this paper but RBA regime need to do more to gain effectiveness.   
3.5d IMPAIRMENT IN CURRENCIES VALUE AND INTEREST RATE 
 
ML can also adversely affect currencies and interest rates, as launderers reinvest funds where 
their schemes are less likely to be detected, rather than where rates of return are higher. And 
it can increase the threat of monetary instability due to the misallocation of resources from 
artificial distortions in asset and commodity prices.105 For example, Panama vulnerable to 
money laundering, including those related to corruption, drug trafficking and other predicate 
crimes, such as tax crimes committed abroad.106 despite the vulnerability, panama has strong 
international financial linkage, for example offshore banks have a significant claim on 
Panamanian borrowers, which stood at US$85 billion (137.7 percent of GDP) at end-September 
2017.107  
The Panamanian authorities have identified banks as a higher risk sector for AML/CFT and 
causing domestically and internationally volatility in the interest rate.108 In other words, the 
sheer magnitude of the economic power that accrues to criminals from money laundering has 
a corrupting effect on all elements of society.109 
 
                                                          
104 Martin Young, ‘Short the Bankers Another major bank ordered closed for money Laundering’ (News BTC, 6 September 
2019) < https//www.newsbtc.com/2019/02/20/short-the-bankers-another-major-bank-ordered-closed-for-money-laundering/> 
accessed 06 September 2019 
 
105 John McDowell and Gary Novis, ‘The consequences of money laundering and financial crime’ (Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US Department of State, 2001) 6(2) An Electronic Journal of the US Department of 
State< http//usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0501/ijee/ijee0501.pdf > accessed 30 August 2019 
 
106 International Monetary Funds, PANAMA selected issues (IMF Country Report No. 19/12) 14 < Panama Selected Issues; 
IMF Country Report No. 19/12; November 21, 2018 > accessed 30 August 2019  
 
107 ibid  
 
108 Ibid 
 
109 ibid 
 
Page 29 of 80 
 
3.5e E-COMMERCE IMPAIRMENT DUE TO ONLINE FRAUD 
 
As afore-stated that financial technology is vulnerable and companies who have lax controlled 
e-commerce system are easy target of the criminals. For example, recently it has discovered 
that criminals had begun using the in-game currency of video game ‘Fortnite’ to launder 
money.110 It found that stolen credit card details were being used to purchase V-bucks, the 
virtual currency used by players for in-game purchases.111 The V-bucks are then sold on to 
players at a discounted rate, enabling the criminals to effectively "clean" the money.112 Severity 
of misuse of technology development can be assessed by the fact that Fortnite’s players 
(including the criminals) moved more than USD three billion worth of transactions through the 
game in 2018.113 Although accurate amount of illicit sales is unknown, a cybersecurity firm 
monitored eBay for only sixty days and found that over USD 250,000 in Fortnite’s items or 
accounts were sold through the auction site114, which are suspected as illicit transaction.  
Further, e-commerce’s popularity resulted in increased money flow and usage of mobile 
payments, which contribute largely to e-commerce sales, have all made the digital payments 
landscape vulnerable to criminal activity.115 Unfortunately, “Cybercriminals are already a step 
ahead and have found numerous loopholes in the relatively nascent e-commerce and Financial 
Technology (fintech) ecosystems”.116  
 
3.6 MONEY LAUNDERING MAY SUPPORT TO INCREASE TERRORISM 
 
ML not only deteriorate economy but provides life blood (money) to the criminals and their illicit 
activities and threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to attain 
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a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.117 
Unfortunately, “the world has been gripped by a wave of terrorist attacks that began shortly 
after the 9/11 attacks”.118 According to most recent independent global statistics , it was 
recorded that within one year 10,900 terrorist attacks around the world, which killed more than 
26,400 people, including 8,075 perpetrators and 18,488 victims.119 Similarly, In 2014 “terrorist 
violence was in peak and nearly 17,000 attacks and more than 45,000 total deaths were 
recorded”.120 Moreover, a drastically hike in the violence can be evident that within eight months 
of 2019, about 1,441 terror attacks and 6,466 casualties has been reported.121  
The aforesaid statistics and data establish that ML is what enables criminals to reap the benefits 
of their crimes, and a direct threat to economic stability.122 Illicit funds and illegal transactions 
leads to corruption and tax evasion, which make it difficult for governments to deliver 
sustainable and inclusive growth by diminishing the resources available for productive 
purposes, such as building roads, schools, and hospitals. “Criminal activity undermines state 
authority and the rule of law while squeezing out legitimate economic activity”.123  
Although, countries have adopted FATF’s recommendations, whether voluntary or under peer 
pressure, knowing the fact that once a country comes to be “viewed as vulnerable to illicit 
financial flows, their financial system may face long-term reputational damage, costly demands 
for additional documentation and the loss of business. This may marginalize already fragile 
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economies, threaten remittance channels and foreign direct investment, and drive financial 
flows underground”.124  
 
Unfortunately, regardless continue efforts and investment, AML regime have been staying 
ahead of the curve.125 As the ML/FT typologies are advanced compare to AML/CFT regime due 
to their reactive ethos and despite having new piece of technology, legislation and regulation, 
there comes a new challenge. Yet, it is often believed that AML/CFT regime are barely 
scratching the surface when it comes to detection and prevention.126 The criminals seem 
always to be a step ahead, adopting more and more sophisticated practices to move and 
"clean" money. As such, it seems almost impossible for the agencies to keep up with this 
constantly evolving landscape, because as soon as one avenue is closed, another opens-up.127 
Frustratingly, by the time procedures are in place to combat these new typologies, the criminals 
will have already moved on to another method of laundering money, such is the nature of the 
game.128 While the reality of completely stopping such criminal activity is extremely difficult, 
however, the regulated entities may take some action to mitigate the phenomenon, including 
monitoring the transfer of high-value goods, identification of customer and sharing data with 
relevant law enforcement agencies.129 that can be taken to mitigate the problem going forward, 
particularly as the current practices appear to have reached a stalemate in various cases.130  
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3.7 CONSEQUENCES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OF FATF’s STANDARDS 
The importance of AML/CFT standards are so significant that almost every country has 
criminalized money laundering and terrorism financing and established a legal framework to 
freeze terrorist assets.131 The national regulations are becoming stricter ever and apart from 
fines and sanction, regulators continue to emphasize the role of individual compliance officers, 
senior executives and board members, and have increased attempts to hold them personally 
liable for compliance failures.132 For example, The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(“FinCEN”) and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announced that 
former Chief Compliance officer held personally liable and he was barred from performing a 
compliance function for three years and liable to pay a $250,000 penalty due violation of 
Banking Secrecy Act 1970 (USA) and breach of AML Regulations.133 Similarly, USA has 
imposed €15 million fine on Swiss Bank UBS's French subsidiary, and fines of up to € 500,000 
for six top executives134, as they failed to file suspicious activity reports and did not have a 
reasonably designed AML program to monitor high-risk accounts belonging to non-US 
residents.135 
The risk of non-compliance with AML (including but not limited to Know Your Customer (“KYC”) 
and Sanctions) requirements continues to increase, and as evidenced by several high-profile 
fines and investigations in recent years, regulated entities are increasingly under pressure to 
identify ways to manage their AML risks more effectively.136 As per an independent report since 
2008 to 2018, the regulators of the worldwide (the North American, European and Asia Pacific 
regions) financial Institutions has fined approximately  $26 billion for non-compliance with AML, 
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KYC and sanctions regulations.137 Further, lately Financial Conduct Authority (FCA - UK) has 
imposed roughly £201.2 million fine on Standard Chartered Bank for non-compliance of 
AML/CFT standards, such as having poor control on CDD and on-going monitoring of high-risk 
products.138  
Concisely, only in 2018 financial regulators around the world imposed more than USD 2.9 billion 
in fines related to AML compliance failures, thirty-eight (38) AML enforcement actions initiated 
or concluded and eight (8) senior compliance managers were held personally liable, made them 
barred form employment and imposed approximately USD 2.7 million fines on them.139 
Prevention of ML/TF is not only challenge for the high-risk countries but unfortunately, the 
countries who has already considered as ‘low-risk’ jurisdictions140 has faced recently high level 
of ML scandals.141 For example, it is reported on the response of internal investigation of a 
banker142 that USD 233 billion (€200bn) in payments was laundered through the Estonian 
branch of Danske Bank  and cash flowing illegally out of Russia, the UK and the British Virgin 
Islands.143 Whether these breaches happened due to intentional or unintentional lapses by the 
regulator (supervisory lapses) or by the subject regulated entities (poor quality of CDD, 
assignment of risk rate or having weak client monitoring system).144 Consequently, the chief 
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executive of the bank compelled to resign and flowing other international impacts and resultant 
other investigations has also opened against some regulated entities operating in low-risk 
countries.145 Furthermore, this incident not only compelled to the regulated entities to re-
designed AML process and made measures to prevent financial system to expose from illicit 
activities, but regulators to reconsider the regulation and supervisory system to prevent the 
countries form another devastation.146 These re-engineering exercise is not so simple, it incur 
heavy cost to utilise human resources and time, and ultimately cause another damage to the 
economy by cutting profit of the regulated entities. 
3.8 CONCLUSION: 
 
The above discussion divulges that ML have a negative economic effect because they (i) 
generate economic distortions that decrease the productivity of licit factors in the economy; (ii) 
erode the financial and real sectors that are infiltrated by asset laundering, generating 
bankruptcy risks and ultimately financial crises; and (iii) undermine government institutions 
through corruption and capture.147  
Further, ML has increased substantially in recent years in both, ‘high-risk’ and ‘low-risk’ 
countries due to (1) Excessive human intervention on the decision making process; (2) 
insufficient and redundant regulation, controls and measure; (3) lack of skilled and professional 
personnel; (4) incompetent transaction monitoring system (fail to identify suspected illegal 
activities); and particularly; (5) well versed criminals with knowledge of financial system and 
capacity to abuse and misused.  
Therefore, FATF has recommended countries are obligated to implement effective AML/CFT 
standards to respond the economic threat and to avoid heavy penalties and sanctions by 
prioritizing the efforts. In order to implement an effective RBA framework, the regulated entities 
are required: (1) to increase transparency (beneficial owner) in the financial transactions; (2) 
adopt smart transaction monitoring system; (3) prompt suspicious transaction/ activity reporting 
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procedures; (4) Trained and professional human resources who are capable to assess, identify 
and mitigate the AML/CFT risk. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
COMPLICATIONS WITH CURRENT RISK-BASED APPROACH: 
ASSESSMENT AND APPLICATION 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Regulated entities are required to develop RBA framework to 'identify, assess and take effective 
action to mitigate ML and TF risks'.148  Therefore, RBA encompasses recognising the existence 
of the risk(s), undertaking an assessment of the risk(s) and developing strategies to manage 
and mitigate the identified risks.149  
The rational of RBA’s implementation looks sound due to flexible approach but several practical 
complication and conditions associated with as prescribes in chapter 4 and 5. The issues, that 
need to be resolved through coordinative way of thinking to the problem of detecting and 
controlling money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing is to be successfully adopted.150 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The traditional theories of risk are not easily transferable to the arena of AML151 because 
conceptualisation such as ‘rule-based but risk-orientated’; and ‘uncertainty-based approach’ is 
not enough. The stakeholders need to take a more practical view, keeping in mind sensitivity 
and effect of ML/TF as discussed in chapter 3.  
Unfortunately, these theories’ emphasis only on SAR, whereas AML/CFT compliance is not 
merely SAR but a piece of RBA compliance. With compliance of RBA the regulated entities are 
required to assess, identify and set measures to prevent ML/TF, throughout customer 
relationship (from on-boarding till closing the relationship).  
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Moreover, assessing, identifying and managing risk requires excessive human intervention. 
Hence, implementation of an effective RBA involves decision-making process and judgment of 
Individuals who are responsible to undertake AML/CFT risk assessment (here-in-after called 
‘responsible person’), whereas decision-making process is itself based on uncertainty.  
4.2a DEFINING RISK 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines risk as “the probability of a negative occurrence”. 
Therefore, risk is an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative 
effect on activities. A risk has a cause, and if it occurs, a consequence.152 Further, as a risk is 
concerned with unpredictable events that might occur in the future whose exact likelihood and 
outcome is uncertain but could potentially affect their interests/objectives in some way.153 
4.2b DEFINING UNCERTAINTY  
 
According to Oxford dictionary “uncertainty” means "not able to be relied on; not known or 
definite". Thus, uncertainty is understood in its most basic form as not knowing for sure, due to 
lack of information or ambiguous information.154 
4.2c RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
There is a misconception that ‘Risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ are same and ignore its basic differences, 
for example a risk can be assessed, its possibility of occurrence can be predicated, and finally 
it could be managed by set measures up. Whereas, uncertainty is a state where prediction of 
a future outcome is not possible, nor probability of outcome could be assigned therefore 
management of uncertainty is not possible.155 Risk is, therefore, easier to conceptualise, event 
based and typically underpinned by hard data. Uncertainty, in contrast encompasses the 
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unknown, the intangible and the immeasurable and can be viewed as the source of all risk.156 
However, one can say that ‘risk is considered as a subset of uncertainty.157  
4.3 DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
RBA prerogatives fixability and entitles to the regulated entities to apply decision-making 
mechanism while assessing the ML/TF risk  and decisions-making process provides a reflection 
of the uncertainty of outcome.158 This is in stark contrast with decision-making under conditions 
of risk where it is expected that the consequences of a particular decision are known with some 
degree of certainty in advance of making the decision.159 
The decision-making technique possess ﬁve crucial stages: (1) deﬁning the situation; (2) 
determining what is relevant; (3) determining the scope and validity of factual knowledge; (4) 
developing all the alternative solutions; and (5) the chosen solution must be made effective in 
action.160  
Whereas, Human judgement occurs in a world of substantial environmental uncertainties, 
based on limited information available and the person’s perception on the subject being 
judged.161 Hence, one can say that judgement and decision making is a psychological construct 
to understand how judgement and decision making are made by both individual and group.162  
4.4 RBA AND ITS IMPACT ON DECISION-MAKING PROCESS: 
 
RBA allows to recognise uncertainty due to unknows consequences and outcomes of decisions 
and judgments. As the regulated entities are uncertain about the response of their decision by 
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regulators and their customers,163 from the beginning on various occasions, for example (a) 
while assigning or not assigning high risk to a specific customer and perform enhanced or 
simplified due diligence; (b) initiate or not initiate internal investigation where transaction 
monitoring system alerts; and (c) particularly, they fail to report a transaction that eventually 
turned out to be ML; or report a legitimate transaction as suspicious with all the attended 
consequences in term of delay.164 
RBA framework is flexible and as well as complicated therefore responsible person within 
regulated entities are demanded to exercise their intuition and judgement in assessing the 
customer risk characteristic.165 In a daily routine, responsible person needs to assess the risk 
of the customer, judge whether the customer possess high or low risk customer and eventually 
decide whether to proceed with the financial transactions solicited by the customer.166  
Risk assessment involves judgement, of which RBA would involve both anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic rules of thumb, for example; own knowledge will be used as an anchor 
while the knowledge of other people will be adjusted for perceived differences.167 As decision-
making process based on personal knowledge and skills rather to have universal systemic 
framework for AML/CFT within regulated entities to support more consistent decision making. 
hence, knowledge gap may cause serious lapses and consequently regulated entities are 
compelled to pay hefty penalties for failing to properly assess ML/TF risk,168 as earlier 
highlighted that in the last decade (2008 -2018) globally USD $ 26 billion in fines has been 
imposed for non-compliance of RBA framework, such as;  sub-standard Know Your Customer 
(KYC) and breach of sanctions regulations.169  
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The big quantum of losses to the regulated entities has undoubtedly affected the financial 
system and questions were asked what has gone wrong with the regulated AML/CFT risk 
management system, in particular; risk assessment for money laundering? Could the losses be 
avoided should the personnel of the banking institutions be more cautious in assessing the 
money laundering risk?170 
The scholars responded to above questions and suggested that in order to assess ML risk 
responsible persons are required to learn money launders’ twisted mentality171 and use their 
intuitions. An individual may achieve risk assessment competency with adequate knowledge, 
skill and techniques that allow identification, evaluation and development of the individual 
behaviour in carrying out the assigned roles.172 However, risk assessment of a responsible 
person may influence by both internal factors (personal characteristics) and external factors 
(environment of the society, professional bodies, internal policies, core system or the work 
place where the individual is being employed).173    
4.5 RISK-BASED APPROACH 
 
RBA includes the concepts of risk, risk assessment, and risk management,174 whereas, there 
is no defined criteria to assess and manage the risk, which allow regulated entities of differing 
sizes, structures and practices to develop their own appropriate systems.175 The RBA aims to 
provide control to the organization itself to design an AML program that suits it, and 
correspondingly changing the approach from following the letter of the law to practical 
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management of risk.176 This transfer of control from regulatory body to the regulated entity 
provides ﬂexibility but requires the regulated entities to be knowledgeable of ML/TF risks they 
face.177  
In other words, RBA requires regulated entities to apply enhanced measures in areas of high 
risk and simultaneously allows them to take a simplified approach where there are lower risks 
involved.178  Therefore, one can say that RBA framework is based on decision-making process 
and is influenced by external and internal factors such as regulatory requirements and other 
organizational factors such as internal control systems and compliance.179 FATF’s seems  
confused while applying RBA, one hand the regulated entities have been granted discretion to 
develop suitable RBA framework and eventually provided scope of human action, error, 
manipulation and creative compliance.180 On the other hand, imposes heavy penalties and 
sanction due to unknow outcome of decision  and abolishes RBA’s objectives, such as flexibility 
and application of knowledge and intuitions.  
4.6 COMPLICATIONS OF RISK-BASED APPROACH 
   
4.6a LACK OF SKILLED PERSONNEL 
 
Regulated entities are now increasingly moving away from entirely rules-based (red flag) 
transaction monitoring algorithm and supplement these with flexible, intelligence, self-learning 
algorithms to deduct AML/CFT patterns.181 Therefore, the practical application of so-called RBA 
requires resources to gather and interpret information on risk, develop AML procedures and 
systems, as well as well-trained personnel with a sound understanding of the risk and who are 
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capable of making sound judgements.182 Whereas, unfortunately these skills are not readily  
found in either regulators or regulated entities in many jurisdictions183 due to lack of formal 
training and education but mainly RBA’s personal liabilities/ accountability theory.   
4.6b LIABILITIES OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON(S): 
 
Successful implementation and effective operation of RBA to AML/CFT depends on strong 
senior management, leadership and oversight of the development and implementation of the 
RBA across the regulated entities.184 Further, breach of RBA regulation may cause risk of 
sanctions and fines for the regulated entities and responsible person(s) also held to be 
penalized and suffer(s) loss of job.185 Since, human intervention and decision-making is an 
inevitable part of the disclosure process186, and responsible person will not be provided with 
immunity from legal action merely because he is obliged under the law to complete SAR.187 It 
could potentially find themselves subject to a claim for defamation, it may strike fear into the 
hearts of responsible persons188 and cause hindrance in effective implementation of RBA in the 
regulated entity.  
Responsible person gradually became the target of “regulators,” in which some ended up 
“unemployed” at the stake for all non-compliant obligations and wrongdoings.189 For example, 
USA Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued $ 1 million civil penalty and enjoin 
from further employment in any financial institution, against Thomas E Haider (former Chief 
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Compliance Officer) allegedly failed to ensure that company implement an effective AML 
program.190  
In another case, Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) has imposed a fine of USD 45,000 
(AED 165,150) and a restriction form performing any functions in financial industry, for a period 
of 3 years, on a compliance personnel, namely Hany Lotfy Awwad Abdelwahab, for providing 
the DFSA with false, misleading or deceptive information, and for obstructing the DFSA by 
failing to comply with DFSA investigative notices.191 Similarly, Hongkong’s Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC) has issued a reprimand to Hung Lai Ping, a former responsible 
officer of Delta Asia Securities Limited (Delta Asia), and fined her $150,000 for managerial and 
supervisory failures and impaired AML regulation compliance.192  
Theses example shows that RBA made responsible person more vulnerable than ever in their 
day-to-day operations as the personal liability issue continues to exist.193 As compliance officers 
are held accountable for individual and organisational wrongdoings more frequently, they are 
becoming more worried about managing their own personal risk than their job.194 While they 
must manage the overall risk of their organization on one hand, they have to watch their back 
on the other. Consequently, competent and talented professionals are moving their way out of 
the industry.195  And focus on accountability have an impact on the ability to recruit and retain 
skilled senior staff. For example, some top-level positions are difficult to fill as most think that 
no paycheck could match the risk of going to “jail.”196  
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Under RBA framework responsible person has two choices, either to report a SAR, or not to 
report.197 From the regulators’ point of view, the problem arises with the decision ‘not to report’ 
rather than with the reporting.198 If a responsible person fails to report an activity as suspicious 
based on his own sound judgement, the regulators would not excuse the decision, but instead 
would seek to penalise him for failure to report a suspicious activity that subsequently became 
a ML activity.199 The responsible person cannot ordinarily be certain that the outcome of the 
activity he is considering is going to result in money laundering, nor will he be certain of the 
impact of the money laundering activity in the event that it happens.200  
Due to aforesaid reasons ML / TF can be categorised as an uncertain territory and concept of 
the uncertainty-based approach seems correct. However, they only talk about SAR and basic 
issues like CDD, Identification of the customer, transparency has neglected badly. Therefore, 
regulated entities, particularly financial institutions are always uncertain about the transaction’s 
true nature, that is, every transaction can be potential ML. This may be because although 
financial institutions are readily able to make assessments about credit and fraud risk, 
assessing ML and TF risk in financial terms in notoriously difficult.201  
It, therefore, seems unfair to penalise to responsible person in the face of these uncertainties if 
he makes an incorrect decision.202 The risk based approach assumes implicitly that responsible 
person should know the outcome of his decision, and as such, he should be liable for that 
decision given that ‘sanctions or fines are levied for false negatives, that is, for not reporting 
transactions which are later prosecuted as ML or judged to be suspicious ex post.203  This idea 
is  not seems wise, that responsible person and regulated entities get penalised due to outcome 
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of judgement, but needed to consider quality of decision-making process leading to the 
decision.204  
Therefore, this paper suggest that regulators and regulated entities/ responsible person need 
to work together to achieve the right balance in this current environment.205 For example, 
regulators are required to handle the issue of personal liability with a less radical approach 
while disseminating a stronger culture of compliance; whereas responsible person may apply 
better methods in managing their individual accountability risk in order to avoid any regulatory 
disturbance.206 
4.6c ARBITRARY CATEGORISATION OF RISK 
 
Interestingly, AML regime have not defined ‘risk’ but classified the risk into two categories 
namely ‘inherent risk’ and ‘residual risk’.207 However, there is conflict within FATF’s RBA, as 
one hand FTAF has bestowed discretionary power to the regulated entities to assess, identify 
and manage risk keeping in mind their own condition and on the other hand they arbitrary 
categorize  inherent risks and classified as high risk customer, product and jurisdiction rather 
than following objective criteria.208 For example; a customer, is automatically considered a high 
risk if he is politically exposed person (PEP), by virtue of being a top government official or a 
relative of such a person and applies to both domestic, foreign and international organisation 
PEPs209, likewise a Non-profit organizations (NPOs)210; Money of value transfer services 
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(MVTs)211, High Risk countries212, Non-resident customer (individual or non-individual), non-
individual with complexed structure (three of more layers)213.  
Likewise, there is arbitrary classification of countries as ‘low risk’ and ‘high risk’, However, the 
criteria of classification undefined.214 For example, USA has the highest level of money 
laundering in the world215  but is considered a low risk country, while countries for example, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and Yemen with fewer incidents of 
money laundering, in both value and frequency, are considered high risk countries because of 
lax control and lack of ‘political will’.216  
Therefore, arbitrary designation clearly contradicts the essence of an approach that is truly risk 
based, as regulated entities are no more entitled to apply RBA, while dealing with designated 
customer, products and countries. 
4.6d RBA FAILED TO DEFINE SUSPICION 
 
Although RBA emphasises on SAR and recommends substantial penalties and strict 
accountability but failed to define ‘suspicion’ and a task which left to the national courts of law.217 
Hence, court of Appeal (UK) defined ‘suspicion’  and ruled that there should be ‘more than a 
fanciful possibility’ that a person is handling criminal property or involving themselves in money 
laundering.218 A ‘vague feeling of unease’ would not suffice, but the law did not require the 
suspicion to be clear or firmly grounded or based upon reasonable grounds.219 Ultimately, the 
RBA has resulted in the filling of SAR on a scale which has overwhelmed the system and 
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making the detection of crime less effective.220 Further details and implications are discusses 
part 4.2.e, here-in-below. 
4.6e FLOOD OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS (SARs) 
 
The regulated entities are responsible to report to Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), if they 
suspect or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity 
or are related to terrorist financing.221  Consequently, so-called RBA compliance caused an 
explosion of the SARs receiving FIU on daily basis, for example within one year (2017) globally, 
more than three million SARs received by FIUs.222 However, there is no data centre which can 
confirm number of positive link or match of these SAR with criminals or criminal activity. 
Nevertheless, average of positive reporting can be assessed through NCA’s 2018 (UK) report; 
in this year, 463,938 (four hundred sixty-three thousand nine hundred and thirty-eight)223 
ostensible SARs received by FIU (UK) and only 28 cases were identified as true match, 
whereby only 40 individuals being arrested.224 This reflects a combination of increased 
regulatory requirements, a broader range of institutions subject to BSA/AML regulations, 
stronger compliance programs at regulated entities or possibly a weak detection system 
generating too many alerts (false negatives and false positives) analysed and promoted to 
cases and disclosed to the regulators.225  
As earlier stated, that FinCEN and international bodies including FIU have never disclosed what 
percentage of SARs result in successful prosecution.226 However, above FCA (UK)’ report227, 
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reflects that the SAR filing is a black box228 and does not contribute to fight against ML/TF. Most 
probably, criminal activity does not come with a convenient red flag as it is completely 
indistinguishable from all other legitimate financial transactions.229  
4.6f  CONFLICT BETWEEN REGULATORS AND JUDICIAL DECISION 
 
RBA carry legal and reputational risk, if regulated entities decide to initiate a SAR and 
consequently customer face delays in services. For example, where a financial institution had 
frozen a customer's personal account and six business accounts and made several SARs to 
the National Crime Agency (NCA) UK.230 The customer issued proceedings claiming that the 
bank was in breach of contract for failing to execute his instructions, had breached the Data 
Protection Act 1998 by unjustifiably withholding personal data, and defamed him by repeatedly 
suggesting that the money in his accounts may have been derived from crime.231  
The High court accepted customer’s application and allowed inspection of SAR, contrary to 
FATF’s standards.232 Whereas bank’s application for strike out/ summary judgment on breach 
of contract had refused and held that even bank had a genuine suspension that the money in 
the customer’s account was the proceed of crime, still that suspension required evidence233 
and relied upon previous judgment, wherein the learned judge ruled that to be a suspicion rather 
than a mere feeling of unease it had to be based on possible facts, but the sufficiency of those 
possible facts as a grounding for that suspicion was irrelevant, unless good faith was in issue.234  
On the other hands, if regulated entities fail to report SAR, they may face heavy regulatory fines 
and sanctions. For example, regulated entities globally have paid $321 billion in fines from 2009 
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to 2016 for an abundance of regulatory failings from money laundering to market manipulation 
and terrorist financing.235 Further, according to a report during 2018, more than 16 regulated 
entities, have penalised due to non-filling or delayed filling of SARs236  
The courts do not follow a strict approach or clear parameters when reaching decision on SAR 
relating to ML offences.237 This lack of a strict approach causing confusion as responsible 
person may not be clear on what to do. This impacts on the ability and efforts of regulatory 
objectives. If the outcome of a case touching on suspicions cannot be predicted with any degree 
of certainty, it will affect the ability of the regulators to commence action against certain 
individuals.238 Also, the courts use unnecessary technicalities while interpreting certain aspects 
of the money laundering regulations.239 For instance, it was held that property would be classed 
as criminal where the property was criminal property at the time of commission of offence.240 
Here, the court found the defendant not guilty because at the time the property came into the 
possession of the defendant it was not criminal property.241 Unfortunately, due to ambiguous 
regulation, courts and other authority compelled to intervene according to their own wisdom. 
4.7 REGULATORY COST DECLINES COMMERCIAL GOAL  
 
In order to reduce the heavy duties and cost of AML/CFT rule-based approach from the 
regulated entities, the FATF shifted the strategy to RBA.242 Whereas, when regulated entities 
begin putting in place an RBA, they start to realize that it is not easy to put the theory in to 
practice.243 The effectiveness of RBA depends on the regulated entities agreeing with the 
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regulators about what risks need to be controlled and the manner of control.244 The regulated 
entities for effective RBA, “have put in place the required processes, work force and systems 
to prevent, detect illicit activity and report suspicious activities”.245 And these RBA’s protocol 
are “pushing regulated entities overall cost of compliance to the roof”.246 Hence, the shift in AML 
approach which was hoped to lead to regulatory cost reductions lead to increased costs, and 
the risk of failure is high.247 This not only means a breakdown in the effectiveness of the 
regulatory system but exposes the institution to regulatory risk and costs (such as penalties for 
non-compliance and legal cost due to customers’ complaints).248 
The tension inherent in the AML fight between the commercial ethos and regulatory injunctions 
can, on the practical level, create dilemmas’249 as ‘ultimately, AML runs against the traditional 
ethos as well as the strategic objectives of the regulated entities.250 Ultimately, non-profit 
functions’ (for example compliance and audit) costs has negative impact on the profit of the 
regulated entities. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
 
Hence, keeping in mind above discussion one can say that implementation of an effective RBA 
is difficult and complex.251 As regulators on how enforce and test compliance against such RBA, 
and regulated entities remain nervous whether their own perception of risk will match regulatory 
expectations.252 Since the probability of an activity being ML is not known with certainty, 
decisions should be evaluated based on the process of identifying the nature of the transaction 
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and not on whether a transaction turned out to be money laundering activity.253 Further, the 
regulators and regulated entities are required to go beyond popular measures of risk and 
consider a deeper dive in identifying ML and regulatory risks.254 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RISK BASED APPROACH: PRACTICAL COMPLICATIONS AND 
CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVELY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As stated in chapters 3 that regulated entities are compelled to respond to financial crime and 
predicated offence by  structured prevention and detection efforts in ways that are proportionate 
to the risks involved.255  Whereas, reality is quite different and despite strict RBA regulations, 
focus on individual and institutional accountability, substantial civil penalties and criminal 
liabilities; there is no such thing as ‘zero risk’ in the ML/TF.256 This fact can be evident from the 
breaches illustrated in chapter 3 which confirms that so-called “low risk” countries pose high-
level financial crime risk.257 
The aim of this chapter to highlight practical challenges the regulated entities tackling with258  
while they conduct know your customer (KYC) and customer due diligence (CDD) to comply 
with RBA framework. 
5.2 CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE AND KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER 
 
It appears that the use of terms “CDD” and “KYC” are sometimes confusing.259 Therefore, it is 
necessary to clarify the meaning of these terms through examining the history and the 
development of these concepts.260  
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The term “due diligence” has its origins in Anglo-American law, particularly in the statutory 
regulations controlling the capital market in the United States (USA).261 Originally, the due 
diligence concept appeared in security laws designed to protect investors. It then has evolved 
into the systematic and professional investigation of business opportunities and risks during on-
going sale negotiations.262 It may entail ﬁnancial, marketing, human resources, legal and tax, 
environmental and organizational due diligence.263 In other words, the object of the due 
diligence process is to obtain information and engage in evaluation of the background of a 
target company including its structure, the capabilities of its employees, its market opportunities 
and risks.264 With regard to AML/CFT it normally refers to the investigation procedure of a new 
customer’s background conducted by the regulated entities prior to doing business with the 
new customer.265 
Whereas, the term “KYC” originated in a legislative report on the US Bank Secrecy Act, but 
they were not deﬁned in that report and no examples were given to illustrate what KYC 
means.266 Since 1970, the US government has deployed US banks as the principal agencies 
to track down the proceeds of crime by imposing an obligation to know their customers and to 
report suspicious transactions.267  
KYC and CDD have been introduced as evolving concepts designed to be adaptable and 
effective for use in regulated entities.268 These terms do not have a ﬁxed content, and they 
frequently appear to be used interchangeably.269 However, CDD is often used to refer to a 
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standard that is broader than KYC.270 KYC could be conceived of as the speciﬁc CDD standard 
imposing on the regulated entities the duty to identify their customers.271 
5.3 CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE OR NIGHTMARE? 
The regulated entities are responsible to undertake CDD measures, for example (1) identifying 
the customer and verifying the customer’s identity using reliable, independent source of 
documents, data or information; (2) identifying the beneficial owner such that the regulated 
entities is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is. For legal person and 
arrangements, this should include regulated entities undertaking the ownership and control 
structure of the customer; (3) understand and, as appropriate, obtaining information on the 
purpose and intended nature of the business relationship; (4) conducting ongoing due diligence 
on the business relationship and structuring of transactions undertaken throughout the course 
of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the 
entities’ knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including where necessary, 
the source of funds.272  
In 2014 the US (IRS) introduced the Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) 
regulations, demanding regulated entities, particularly financial institutions to report US taxable 
customers. Simultaneously, Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has developed Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for the Automatic Exchange of Information 
(AEOI), regarding bank accounts on global level (105 countries), between tax authorities.273 
Hence, apart from above responsibilities a new aspect that falls in the scope of CDD is the 
determination of reportable accounts to government authorities of a multitude of countries. This 
process requires regulated entities to classify the tax status of the customer toward the country 
of which they are a fiscal resident. The Customer declares this information to the regulated 
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entities as part of the client’s identification information. The fiscal residence of the client can be 
stored along with the client’s other KYC/ CDD information in the system.274  
CDD is a process of identifying and verifying the customer; periodically monitoring of customer 
and their transaction; initiating SARs; keeping eyes on customer’s unusual activities (personal 
status or business); responding to the investigation authorities’ queries. However, due to words 
limitation this chapter discusses only one aspect of CDD, that is: ‘customer identification’. 
5.4 CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION 
 
The identification and verification processes are therefore not merely aimed at recording the 
customer’s correct name but at obtaining sufficient information to draw an appropriate business 
and risk profile of the customer.275 Profiling enables the regulated entities to assess and mitigate 
the risks posed by the customer.276 It also supports customer monitoring because it assists the 
regulated entities to anticipate the customer’s normal transaction pattern. A transaction that 
deviates from that pattern may attract the attention of the regulated entities’ customer 
monitoring program and may result in a report to FIU.277  
Hence, the reliability of profiling depends however on the sufficiency and accuracy of the 
customer information that is gathered. Therefore, ‘costumer identification’ contain four main 
steps, such as (i) information collection (taking ID credentials), (ii) verification (verifying the 
customer against credentials and verifying the credentials themselves), (iii) checking customers 
against government lists, and (iv) recordkeeping.278 Apparently, identification process seems 
simple, but carries several complications, specifically if, potential customer is high risk, for 
example PEP or legal person or arrangement with complex structure. Complex structure 
defines in part 34.3b here-in below. 
                                                          
274 Gareth Peters and Guy Vishnia, ‘Blockchain Architectures for Electronic Exchange Reporting Requirements EMIR, Dodd 
Frank, MiFID I/II, MiFIR, REMIT, Reg NMS and T2S’ (2016) < 
https//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2832604&download=yes> accessed 17 July 2019 
 
275 Bank for international Settlements, ‘Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Customer Due Diligence (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2001)  < https//www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d405.htm> accessed 15 August 2019 
 
276 Louis de Koker, ‘The FATF's customer identification framework fit for purpose?’ (2014) 17(3) Journal of money laundering 
control 281 
 
277 Ibid 
 
278 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Bank Secrecy Act Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual (2014) < 
https//bsaaml.ffiec.gov/docs/manual/01_Introduction/01.pdf > accessed 10 August 2019 
 
Page 56 of 80 
 
5.4a INFORMATION COLLECTION 
The regulated entities are obliged to collect substantial personal information from the 
prospective customer, for example name, birthdate, nationality, address, profession, National 
identification number (individual) and legal/ incorporation documents, nature of business, 
information of intermediate companies, personal information of Directors, authorized 
signatories, beneficial owners (non-individual).279  
The collection of identity and other personal documents is not difficult in developed countries 
(for example USA, UK, Germany) mainly; identity document is mandatory for every resident 
and citizen due to state rules; and secondly they are well aware about law therefore, most 
people would not have difficulty in providing the necessary documents.280 Whereas, under 
developed countries (for example Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Africa) where the 
general population did not see the importance of registering births and deaths, and as a result, 
many people from remote villages do not have formal identification documents.281 Further, 
many citizens do not ever intend to travel and thus do not require passports and would not see 
the need to incur the expense of acquiring this document. Similarly, driving is a novelty reserved 
for the wealthy, and as such, driver’s licenses are not owned by most working-class citizens.282 
Furthermore, vast rural areas of these countries are still reliant on kerosene lamps and wood 
burners and therefore do not have utility bills or other such forms of identiﬁcation.283 This 
situation is further exacerbated by the land registry where manual ledgers are still used. The 
land is also passed down, with many generations acquiring the property before it is notarised, 
and therefore, address veriﬁcation is not as simple and straight forward as it is in the developed 
world.284  
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Hence, due to unavailability of identification documents deprive many customers from financial 
services and ultimately, it encourages cash economy, which are vulnerable for ML/ TF. 
Therefore, merely enactment of strict AML/CFT regulation is not enough for prevention of 
financial crime, but the legislators are required to work together with the regulated entities to 
amend the stricter clauses as per their circumstance. For example, UK has introduced ‘standard 
evidence’ and ‘non-standard evidence’ and recommended that ‘non-standard’ identification 
documents are acceptable in special circumstance, such as people don’t have standard 
identification documents.285 
5.4b VERIFICATION OF IDENTIFYING DOCUMENTS 
Identity information required to verify through an ID card or official (state) document.286 
Although, verification individual customer is not simple and nor cost effective (will discuss here-
in-below) but for the corporate customer, it is more complexed and required significant time and 
effort.287 In addition to verifying the details from the enterprise, intermediate entities, Directors, 
authorized signatories and ultimate beneficial owners (here-in-after called ‘relevant individuals’) 
also have to be identified and verified.  
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Figure 2288:  
Further, identification is a process of investigation, therefore unwrapping of a corporate 
customer is essential to prevent financial system from AML/CFT. Figure 2 is an example of 
unwrapping and discloses the process to determine direct and ultimate beneficial owner of non-
individual customer to detect potential financial fraud; for example, tax evasion. The above 
figure shows that initially ‘Company ABC’ seems one unit, however mining of the entity reveals 
that it carries three intermediate companies and ultimately owned by five individuals.  
Apart from identification of ultimate beneficial owner, regulated entities are obliged to have an 
overview of the company organigram and all the intermediary entities that exercise a 
determined amount of control in the company, as well as the entities in which the company 
holds a certain threshold of shares.289 As such, a great part of KYC consists of identifying and 
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verifying the correct relationships between companies. This information is subject to frequent 
change due to the increase or decrease of control or ownership stakes.290  
CDD is not only concerned with the recording of identifying particulars, but also with 
“verification”. Verification refers to the authentication of the identifying particulars291 through 
government’s data system or document issuance authority. Therefore, regulated entities are 
expected to refer to reliable, independent source documents, data or information to verify the 
customer’s identifying particulars.292 As afore-stated that veriﬁcation is not as simple and 
straight forward293 due to unavailability of formal documents and data. In addition, the 
identification and verification requirements have placed obligations on the regulated entities 
that are expensive to meet. To the extent that such expenses are reflected in increased costs 
of services, financial barrier to access is raised.294  
Therefore, responsible person has the challenge to advise on and implement compliance risk 
management systems that are, on the one hand, affordable, realistic and supportive of the 
business of the regulated entities and, on the other hand, ensure compliance with the law295.  
5.4c CUSTOMER NAME SCREENING AGAINST SANCTION LIST 
 
The third requirement of customer identification is to check the customer name (including 
intermediaries, related individuals and connected PEPs) against national and International 
sanction list and report, if there ‘positive true match’. Hence, the regulated entities oblige to link 
their internal system to screening lists (for example, governmental and intercontinental 
sanctions, terrorism, other illegal activities, political exposure, and negative press) while using 
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external providers for screening purposes.296 In order to effective identification process 
regulated entities are compelled to have an automated screening system, so that it hits in real 
time and block onboarding, until the hit is investigated and cleared.297 
Apart from automation cost, name screening process is itself challenging as despite 
international AML/CFT regime publish centralized sanction list, the regulated entities force to 
screen name of the prospective customers through more than 14 sanction lists. These include 
but not limited to, lists published by the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), 
U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the United Nations Security Council, and 
each local jurisdictions’ regulatory and law enforcement agencies, such as the Indonesia 
National Counter Terrorism Agency (INPT) and other countries designated lists. 
As aforesaid that regulated entities must be alert to transactions that involve parties identified 
on a sanctions list.298 This is sometimes difficult, particularly as it relates to screening customer 
lists for persons whose names are not originally in Roman characters, such as suspected 
terrorists from Middle Eastern countries or sanctions lists in Asian countries. For example, most 
of the names of “designated terrorists” on the sanction lists also include numerous “Also Known 
As” alternatives.299 While some names may be aliases, others are confusing because the 
customs are not understood.300 Therefore, a responsible person is also responsible to 
knowledge to understand Arab naming customs and protocols to alleviate the confusion,301 
such as: 
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• All names are transliterated from an Arabic script in which short consonants are most often 
left out. So, the name Mohammed might be written on a financial account as Mohamed or 
Mohamad.302  
• Arabic names are typically long. A person’s second name is the father’s name. If a “bin” or 
“ibn” precedes the name, it indicates “son of.” If a family name is included at the end, it will 
sometimes have “al” preceding it.303  
• There is widespread use of certain names such as “Mohamed,” “Ahmed,” “Ali,” or any name 
with the prefix “Abd-” or “Abdul,” which means “servant of,” and is followed by one of 99 suffixes 
used to describe God.304  
• Many Arabic names begin with the word “Abu.” If it is a first name, it is probably not the 
person’s given name, because “Abu” means “father of.” “Abu,” followed by a noun, means 
something like “freedom” or “struggle,” and is used by both terrorists and legitimate political 
leaders. Only when “Abu” is a prefix of a surname should it be accepted as a given name.305 
Let’s, take a look on the sanction lists, 
5.4c(i) TREASURY DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (OFAC) 
 
OFAC administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions imposed by the United States 
against targeted foreign countries, terrorist, international narcotics traffickers, and those 
engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.306 RBA 
standards enforces that regulated entities to have policies, procedures, and processes for 
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ensuring compliance with sanctions. Whereas, compliance with OFAC’ Specially Designated 
Nationals ("SDN list")307 is a cumbersome exercise.  
 
Figure 3: OFAC search with 470 matches308: 
In the above figure shows that there are several occasions when responsible person tries to 
screen name of their prospective customer, regardless manual or through automated system 
against sanction list, they could get a huge (470) matches and they become responsible to 
conduct investigation against each match and obtain further documents and information form 
prospective customer, especially when OFAC data is haphazard, with zero consistency and 
missing information.  
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5.4c(ii) HM TREASURY: FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TARGETS 
 
The office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI)/ HM Treasury publishes sanction list 
of all those subject to financial sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom and keep it updated 
in different formats309 The list contains basic information (full name, any known aliases, 
Honorary, professional or religious titles, date of birth, place of birth, nationality, passport 
details, national identification numbers, address, nicknames, title of the financial sanctions 
regime under which designated person is listed, date when the designated person was added 
to list by HM Treasury, date when the information regarding the designated person and unique 
ID reference number) of the individuals / non-individuals who are subject to UK sanction.310  
UK sanction list better than OFAC as format and information are consist and organized. 
 
Figure 4: HMT sanction list311 
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5.4c(iii) UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
The Security Council can act to maintain or restore international peace and security under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Sanctions measures, under Article 41, encompass 
a broad range of enforcement options that do not involve the use of armed force. Since 1966, 
the Security Council has established 30 sanctions regimes, in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, 
the former Yugoslavia (2), Haiti, Iraq (2), Angola, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Eritrea, 
Eritrea and Ethiopia, Liberia (3), DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Lebanon, DPRK, Iran, Libya (2), 
Guinea-Bissau, CAR, Yemen, South Sudan and Mali, as well as against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-
Qaida and the Taliban.312  
 
Figure 5: UN sanction list313 
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Amazingly, today 14 ongoing sanctions regimes which focus on supporting political settlement 
of conflicts, nuclear non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism. The measures have ranged from 
comprehensive economic and trade sanctions to more targeted measures such as arms 
embargoes, travel bans, and financial or commodity restrictions.314 
Moreover, the FATF has declared that PEP (national and international) and their associates 
are high risk, whereas, there is no specific way to identify the PEP and its associates due to 
unavailability of official database.315 Though there are dozens of private providers that offer 
PEPs databases; however, the information contained in them can be a challenge due to lack 
of available and useful information about the identity of PEPs around the world.  
Frustratingly, every sanction list is different and regulated entities are compelled to screen 
name of prospective customer against more than 14 international and unlimited national 
sanction lists. Consequently, while, looking at the process of on-boarding, corporations’ 
expectation that their customer on-boarding time raised with the average increased to 32 days 
in 2017 from 28 in 2016.316 And in some jurisdiction, tedious CDD and identification may take 
anything up to 6-7 weeks to onboard a new individual customer and 34 weeks to onboard a 
new Non-individual customer. For every day that a client is not onboarded, it costs the 
equivalent of a full day’s trade – so if the client is trading $1 million per day, then it quickly 
accrues to over $200 million over the 34-week duration.317  
Ultimately, the regulated entities are compelled to deploy expensive software, hire services of 
external providers and compliance personnel to meet FATF standards. Such a lengthy and 
costly process is not desirable for economy growth, customer and business. Regardless of cost, 
there is no guarantee nor any way to measure to know that embedded sanction list in the 
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external service providers are accurate and reflecting real time updates, which cause lapses 
and ultimately regulated expose with unwanted customers. 
5.4d RECORD KEEPING 
 
The regulated entities are required to maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records; 
such as CDD measures (e.g. copies or records of official identification documents like 
passports, identity cards, driving licences or similar documents), business correspondence, 
including the results of any analysis undertaken (e.g. inquiries to establish the background and 
purpose of complex, unusual large transactions), both domestic and international, to enable 
them to comply swiftly with information requests from the competent authorities.318 Record 
keeping helps the company understands the entire relationship with the customer. In addition, 
a systematic record keeping workflow helps the company meets its reporting obligations in 
retrieval and submission of appropriate data to their local financial intelligence unit or 
regulators.319 
“Increasingly protracted, complex and costly processes associated with RBA compliance and 
record-keeping underscore the challenges equally financial institutions and their corporate 
customers.”320 “In 2017 financial institutions with $10 billion or more in revenue have seen their 
average spend on RBA related procedures increase to USD $150 million comparatively from 
USD $142 million in 2016, while their number of deployed employees has skyrocketed to an 
average of 307 CDD compliance professionals in 2017 from 68”. Despite this rise in headcount, 
just over a third of firms reported that scarce resources remain their biggest challenge in 
conducting KYC and customer due diligence (CDD) processes.321  
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“Similarly, for financial firms, documenting and maintaining current KYC records to keep 
compliant remains difficult and surprisingly, average 18 percent of regulated entities takes 
action, when an event occurs to trigger a KYC review”.322 “Due to endless regulatory 
requirement, in 2017, less than one third (30%) of corporate respondents make their financial 
institutions aware of all material changes involving KYC and CDD”323 and compelled to do own 
CDD to keep update their records. While financial institutions have continued to invest 
significant resources in KYC, the compliance issues and concerns both they and their clients 
face appear to be rising.324  
Although, according to FATF 4th round assessment, record-keeping is the only FATF’s RBA 
requirement which has complied almost every country. However, there are some instance, 
where regulators imposed substantial penalties due to breach of record-keeping standards. For 
example,  In 2017, the FCA levied 229.4 million pounds ($307 million) in penalties, which is a 
10-fold increase from 22.2 million pounds in 2016.325 
While the administrative burdens and high costs of implementing a compliant CDD program 
can be overwhelming, especially for smaller firms, the obstacle has also created an opportunity 
for organizations to enhance their competitive advantage.326 This has resulted in increasing 
complex and extensive CDD requirements, with a cost that is estimated $60 million annually 
on average,327 while the customer experience was evaluated as poor. 
5.5 CONCLUSION  
 
RBA Regulations have strained CDD obligations in order to mitigate growing counterparty risks. 
Specifically, new KYC on-boarding and reporting provisions are designed to limit client risk in 
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the form of AML, terrorism financing, tax evasion and politically exposed persons.328 The recent 
Panama Papers leak329 has fuelled even stricter CDD reforms330, designed to identify the real 
owners of business bank accounts.331  
Unfortunately, despite spending a substantial sum on CDD regulated entities are exposed due 
to ML/TF and regulatory penalties and sanctions and on the other hand, customer satisfaction 
is suffering from increased regulatory requirements. As before entering into a financial relation, 
customers, and in particular corporate customers have to go through lengthy paperwork 
procedures, for which regulated entities have insufficient skilled resources to handle the 
process.332 
 
  
                                                          
328  Thomson Reuters, ‘How banks can turn the KYC compliance challenge into a competitive advantage’ (2019) < 
https//legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/how-banks-can-turn-the-kyc-compliance-challenge-into-a-competitive-
advantage > accessed on 15 July 2019 
 
329 Bastian Obermayer, Frederik Obermaier, Vanessa Wormer and Wolfgang Jaschensky, ‘The secrete of dirty money Theses 
are panama papers’ < https//panamapapers.sueddeutsche.de/articles/56ff9a28a1bb8d3c3495ae13/ > accessed on 15 July 
2019 
 
330 ‘FinCEN Final Rule New Customer Due Diligence Requirements’ (Trulioo, 9 January 2019) < 
https//www.trulioo.com/blog/fincen-final-cdd-rule/ > accessed 15 July 2019 
 
331 Thomson Reuters, ‘How banks can turn the KYC compliance challenge into a competitive advantage’ (2019) < 
https//legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/how-banks-can-turn-the-kyc-compliance-challenge-into-a-competitive-
advantage > accessed on 15 July 2019 
 
332 José Parra-Moyano and Omri Ross, ‘KYC Optimization Using Distributed Ledger Technology’ (2017)1(1)SSRN < 
https//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897788> accessed 16 July 2019  
Page 69 of 80 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
6.1 CONCLUSION 
 
Financial crime (ML/TF) is real problem to the regulated entities and to the nation as whole. As 
money is the lifeblood of crime and without ML, criminals would have no mechanism to launder 
their dirty money and claim it as clean.333 Therefore, in order to address this problem FATF has 
issued RBA standards and thereby, regulated entities are obliged to assess, identify and 
mitigate the risk by applying RBA and deploy their resources more efficiently by focusing on 
higher-risk areas.334  
However, RBA seems an attractive concept but poses theoretical and practical implementation 
problems. Part of the problem stems from the conceptualisation of risk; the comprehensive 
importation of the concept of risk from other disciplines without proper realignment; and the lack 
of agreement on the objective of AML/ CFT is to prevent ML and combat TF within regulated 
entities.335  
Secondly, arbitrary risk classification (high risk) due to customer, product and country type, 
clearly misses the objective of RBA (asses, identify and take effective action). As the countries 
and regulated entities are compelled to apply ‘high risk’ measures on the designated categories 
without applying their specific circumstance and consequently incurring high cost to comply 
with high-risk’s protocol. 
Thirdly, RBA transmits a clear contradiction, at one hand RBA is flexible and regulated entities 
are empowered to make a judgment to report or not report an activity, and on the other hand it 
imposes personal liabilities on the outcome of the decision.  
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Further, if discuss practical difficulties, RBA has not achieved its objective of minimising the 
compliance cost. Instead of countries and regulated entities are incurring heavy cost on 
systems, work force, external providers to implement RBA (CDD, identification of customer, 
name screening, transaction monitoring and initiating SARs). Further, forced to pay penalties 
whether lapses are intentional or unintentional.  
More importantly, on boarding is the first step where regulated entities can stop illicit money 
and dirty transactions. Because if "dirty money" enter in the international financial system, the 
more difficult it is to identify its origin.336 Whereas, regulated entities suffer challenges in 
identification of prospective customer and forced to involve in tedious exercise due to 
governments, regulators and international RBA regime’s unclear and hazy data (as briefed in 
chapter 5). Consequently, regulated entities expose their system with illicit funds and 
transactions, which cause ineffectiveness of RBA. 
Concisely, apparently idea of RBA strikes but its implementation challenges provide a great 
room of improvement. 
  6.2 RECOMMENDATION 
 
Apparently, almost every country has criminalised ML and TF and established a legal 
framework to freeze terrorist assets.337 But there are several gaps and in order to achieve an 
effective AML/CFT compliance, FATF needs to work together with countries (including 
developing countries) to achieve the right balance in their current environment.338 
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 6.2a RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FATF 
 
The FATF needs to consider that as ML/TF is not merely a risk but create a situation where the 
probability of occurrence of an event is known but the consequences in the event of occurrence 
remain unknown.339  
Therefore, FATF required to take following steps to improve the effectiveness of RBA. 
i. Provide a better conceptualisation of the problem of risk within the AML/CFT domain;340 
ii. Ensure that personal liability should be depending on quality of decision-making 
process leading to the decision, rather outcome of decisions. This is because this 
amendment will help to align the interest of regulated entities with those of regulators 
without the need for fines and other pressures.341   
iii. Create a centralized depository for sanction lists and provide a universal guideline for 
the national and international institutions (for example OFAC, HM treasury, UN council) 
so that data could be stored in universal format. And enable regulated entities to 
retrieve sanction lists from one forum and conduct name screening (on-boarding and 
periodically) without wasting time and money. 
 
6.2b RECOMMENDATION FOR REGULATORS 
  
 
The regulators need to consider that only AML/CFT regulations and strict compliance is not 
enough. They need to introduce a culture of support and integrity for effectiveness of RBA. 
Therefore, countries are needed to have strong process and adequate system of: 
i. public institutions, political rights and rule of law;  
ii. high levels of financial/ political transparency;  
iii. independent press;  
iv. adequate resources to control financial system;  
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v. cash-less economy; and 
vi. prohibition of smuggling activity and (7) restriction on drug, human and wildlife products 
trafficking.342 
vii. develop consistency between AML regime and other law with cooperation of legislative 
bodies, to avoid contradiction between regulators and court’s decision 
Furthermore, implementation of RBA is needs consistency in a reliable manner. Following 
which needs to be agreement between the regulators and regulated entities about what the 
elements of a risk assessment system should be, and this in turn needs to be based on an 
understanding of how different forms of ﬁnancial activity give rise to risk.343  
6.2c RECOMMENDATION FOR REGULATED ENTITIES 
 
 
Efficient and effective RBA compliance is assured when regulated entities will be willing to 
wholeheartedly support the desire of regulators to prevent ML/TF. 
Therefore, the regulated entities required to develop highly sophisticated risk transaction 
monitoring system,344 hire well trained personnel with sound understanding of the AML/ CFT 
risk and more important certainty of sound judgments or decisions,345 place accountability and 
procedural transparency, arrange periodically training to enhance skill of the responsible 
person. 
 
  
                                                          
342 International Centre for Asset Recovery, ‘Basel AML Index Report’ (Basel Institute of Governance, 2018) < 
https://www.baselgovernance.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/basel_aml_index_10_09_2018.pdf> accesses 21 July 2019 
 
343 Stuart Ross, Michelle Hannan, ‘Money laundering regulation and risk‐based decision-making’ (2007) 10(1) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 106 
 
344 Stravros Gadinis and Colby Mangels, ‘Collaborative Gatekeepers’ (2016) 73 (2) Washington & Lee Law Review 797 
 
345 Lishan Ai, John Broome and Hao Yan, ‘Carrying out a risk‐based approach to AML in China partial or full implementation?’ 
(2010) 13(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 394 
Page 73 of 80 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
STATUES 
 
1. FATF Recommendation, ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism & Proliferation’ Updated June 2019 < https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf > 
accessed 15 July 2019 
 
2.  FATF Recommendation, ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism & Proliferation’ Updated October 2018 < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf> 
accessed 30 June 2019 
 
3. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (adopted 
20 December 1988, entered into force 11 November 1990) 1582 UNTS 95 (an informal/ shortened title) 
 
 
CASESLAW 
 
4. Lonsdale v National Westminster Bank plc [2018] EWHC 1843 (QB); [2018] 7 WLUK 430 
 
5. R v Da Silva [2006] EWCA Crim 1654; [2007] 1 WLR 303 
 
6. R v Amir (Abida Shaheen) [2011] EWCA Crim 146 (CA); [2011]4 All ER 417 (CA) 
 
7. Shah v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd [2009] EWHC 79 (QB) 
 
8. U S Department of Treasury v. Haider, Case No. 0:15-cv-01518 (D. Minn.) 
 
 
REGULATORY GUIDANCE 
 
9. Bank for International Settlements, ‘Sound management of risks related to money laundering and financing of 
terrorism: revisions to correspondent banking annex (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2017) 
 < https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d405.htm> accessed 15 August 2019 
 
10. Bank for international Settlements, ‘Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Customer Due Diligence (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2001) 
 < https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d405.htm> accessed 15 August 2019 
 
11. Council of Europe, ‘Annual Report MONEYVAL Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures and the Financing of Terrorism’ (2017) < https//rm.coe.int/moneyval-annual-report-2017-
eng/16808af3c2> accessed 21 July 2019 
 
12. FATF Risk Based Approach Guidance : The Rational of Risk Based Approach (FATF 2019) < https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/documents/riskbasedapproach/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> accessed 30 July 2019 
 
13. FATF, ‘Universal consolidated process and procedure for mutual evaluation and follow-up’ (updated June 2019) 
published < https//www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/universal-procedures.html> 
accessed 28 June 2019 Mutual evaluation’ 
 
14. FATF Guidance for A Risk-Based Approach for the Banking sectors (FATF 2014) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/risk-based-approach-banking-sector.html > accessed 30 
July 2019 
 
15. Financial Action Task Force, “FATF guidance: anti-money laundering and terrorist financing measures and 
financial inclusion”, (FATF 2013) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/financialinclusion/documents/revisedguidanceonamlcftandfinancialinclusion.html> accessed 
15 August 2019 
 
16. FATF on Money Laundering, Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing-High Level Principles and Procedures (June 2007) < https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/High%20Level%20Principles%20and%20Procedures.pdf > accessed 30 
July 2019 
 
17. Financial Action Task Force, 'FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: Prepaid Cards, Mobile Payments and 
Internet-Based Payment Services' (2013) < https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Guidance-RBA-NPPS.pdf > accessed 21 July 2013 
Page 74 of 80 
 
 
 
18. FATF, ‘Mutual evaluation’ < https//www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> accessed 28 June 2019 
 
19. Procedure for the FATF Fourth round of AML/CFT mutual Evaluation (updated June 2019) and Methodology for 
assessing Technical Compliance with FATF recommendation and the effectiveness of AML/CFT systems are 
published < https//www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> 
accessed 28 June 2019 
 
20. Study Guide, CAMS Certification Exam (6th edn, The Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists 
(ACAMS) Miami, USA) 
 
21. UNODC, ‘Money-Laundering and globalization’ (United Nations office Drug and Crime, 2019) < 
https//www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/globalization.htm> accessed 21 July 2019 
 
 
BOOKS 
 
22. Glimcher W P, Neuroeconomics: decision making and the brain (Elsevier Academic Press 2009) 
Peter F Drucker 
 
23. LaFree G, Dugan L and Miller E, Putting Terrorism in Context: Lesson from the global terrorism 
database (1st edn, Routledge 2014) 
 
24. Larson W E and Clifford F Gray, Project Management: The Managerial Process (5th ed, New York: 
McGraw-Hill Irwin 2011) 
 
25. Loosemore M, Raftery J, Reilly C and Higgon D, Risk Management in Projects (2nd ed, Routledge 
2006) 
 
26. Mitsilegas V, Money laundering counter-measures in the European Union: A new paradigm of 
security governance versus fundamental legal principles (Vol 20 Kluwer Law International 2003) 
 
27. Nguyen L C, ‘Preventing the use of financial institutions for money laundering and the implications 
for financial privacy’ (2018) 21 (1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 47 
 
28. Picot G, Handbook of International Mergers and Acquisitions: Preparation, Implementation and 
Integration, (eds) (Palgrave Macmillan 2002) 
 
29. Strange S, Mad money: When markets outgrow governments (The University of Michigan Press 
1998) 
 
 
SCHOLARLY ARTICLES 
 
30. Adeyemi A, ‘Slipping through the net: The financial conduct authority’s approach in lessening the 
incidence of money laundering in the UK’ (2018) 21(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 203 
 
31. Ahmed A S, ‘Practical application of anti-money laundering requirements in Bangladesh: An insight 
into the disparity between anti-money laundering methods and their effectiveness based on 
resources and infrastructure’ (2017) 20(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 428 
 
32. Ai L, John Broome and Hao Yan, ‘Carrying out a risk‐based approach to AML in China: partial or full 
implementation?’ (2010) 13(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 394 
 
33. Ai L and Tang J, ‘Risk-based Approach for Designing Enterprise-wide AML Information System 
Solution’ (2011) 18 (3) Journal of Financial Crime 268 
 
34. Ai L, ‘Rule-based but risk-oriented” approach for combating money laundering in Chinese financial 
sectors’ (2012) 15 (2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 198 
 
35. Bello U A and Harvey J, ‘From a risk-based to an uncertainty-based approach to anti-money 
laundering compliance’ (2017) 30 (1) Security Journal 24 
 
36. Canhoto I A, ‘Barriers to segmentation implementation in money laundering detection’ (2008) 8(2) 
The Marketing Review 163 
 
37. Cuéllar F M, ‘The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the 
Disruption of Criminal Finance (2003) 93 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 311 
 
Page 75 of 80 
 
38. Dolar B and Shughart F II W, ‘Enforcement of the USA Patriot Act's anti-money laundering 
provisions: Have regulators followed a risk-based approach?’ (2011) 22(1) Global Finance Journal 
19 
 
39. Demetis D and Angell O I, ‘The risk‐based approach to AML: representation, paradox, and the 3rd 
directive’ (2007) 10 (4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 412 
 
40. Drucker F P, ‘Long-range planning: challenge to management science’ (1959) 5(3) Management 
Science Journal 247 
 
41. Favarel-Garrigues G, Thierry Godefroy and Pierre Lascoumes, ‘Sentinels in the Banking Industry: 
Private Actors and the Fight against Money Laundering in France’ (2008) 48(1) British Journal of 
Criminology 1 
 
42. Grant D T, ‘Toward a Swiss solution for an American problem: an alternative approach for banks in 
the war on drugs’ (1995) 14 (21) Annual Review of Banking law 225 
 
43. Grote G, ‘Promoting safety by increasing uncertainty—Implications for risk management’ 
(2015) Safety Science < http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2014.02.010 > accessed 25 July 2019 
 
44. Gadinis S and Mangels C, ‘Collaborative Gatekeepers’ (2016) 73 (2) Washington & Lee Law 
Review 797 
 
45. Gao S, Xu D, Wang H and Green P, ‘Knowledge-based Anti-money Laundering: A Software Agent 
Bank Application’ (2009) 13 (2) Journal of Knowledge Management 63 
 
46. Harding N and Trotman T K, ‘Improving Assessments of Another Auditor's Competence’ (2009) 28 
(1) AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 53 
 
47. 
 
Harris M,’ Money laundering: Part 2 - how money laundering is impacting compliance teams on the 
ground’ (2019) 8 (2) Compliance & Risk Journal 8 
 
48. Isa I M, Sanusi M Z, Haniff N M and Barnes A P, ‘Money Laundering Risk: From the Bnaker’s and 
Regulators perspectives’ (2015) 28 Procedia Economics and Finance Journal 7 
 
49. Johnson J, ‘Third round FATF mutual evaluations indicate declining compliance (2008) 11 (1) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 47 
 
50. Johnson J, ‘How will the financial services sector respond to the Financial Action Task Force’s 
increased customer due diligence requirements’ (2003) 5(2) Journal of International Banking 
Regulation 127 
 
51. Johnson J, ‘In Pursuit of Dirty Money: Identifying Weaknesses in the Global Financial System’ 
(2001) 5(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 122 
 
52. Joyce L W and Libby R, ‘Some Accounting Implications of Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes 
of Judgment and Choice’ (1981) 19(2) Journal of Accounting Research 544 
 
53. Kumar A V, ‘Money Laundering: concept, significance and its impact’ (2012) 4(2) European Journal 
of Business and Management 113 
 
54. Koker D L, ‘The FATF's customer identification framework: fit for purpose?’ (2014) 17(3) Journal of 
money laundering control 281 
 
55. Koker D L, ‘Identifying and managing low money laundering risk: perspectives on FATF's risk-based 
guidance’ (2009) 16 (4) Journal of financial Crime 334 
 
56. Koker D L, ‘Money laundering control and suppression of ﬁnancing of terrorism: some thoughts on 
the impact of customer due diligence measures on ﬁnancial exclusion’ (2006) 13(1) Journal of 
Financial Crime 26 
 
57. Low J, ‘How to conduct proper customer due diligence (CDD)’ (AML-CFT 14 November 2018) < 
https://aml-cft.net/conduct-proper-customer-due-diligence-cdd/> accessed 10 September 2019 
 
58. Loyayza N, Misas M V E, ‘Illicit activity and money laundering from an economic growth 
perspective: A model and an application of Colombia’ (2019) 159 Journal of Economic Behaviour & 
Organization 442 
 
59. Lootsma Y, ‘Blockchain as the Newest Regtech Application— the Opportunity to Reduce the 
Burden of KYC for Financial Institutions’ (2017) 36 (8) Banking & Financial Services Policy Report 
16 
 
60. Mulligan D, ‘Know your customer regulations and the international banking system: towards a 
general self-regulatory regime’ (1998) 22(5) Fordham International Law Journal 2322 
 
Page 76 of 80 
 
61. McDowell J and Novis G, ‘The consequences of money laundering and financial crime’ (Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US Department of State, 2001) 6(2) An 
Electronic Journal of the US Department of State< 
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0501/ijee/ijee0501.pdf > accessed 30 August 2019 
 
62. Nane T M, ‘Re-thinking FATF: an experimentalist interpretation of the Financial Action Task Force’ 
(2018) 69 (2) Crime, Law and Social Change 131 
 
63. Norton D S, ‘Suspicion of money laundering reporting obligations: Auditor compliance, or sceptical 
failure to engage?’ (2018) 50 Critical perspectives on accounting Journal 56 
 
64. Presutti A V, ‘Anchor and adjustment heuristic effect on audit judgement’ (1995) 10(9) Managerial 
Auditing Journal 13 
 
65. Parra-Moyano J and Ross O, ‘KYC Optimization Using Distributed Ledger Technology’ 
(2017)1(1)SSRN < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897788> accessed 16 
July 2019 
 
66. Reuters T, ‘How banks can turn the KYC compliance challenge into a competitive advantage’ 
(2019) < https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/how-banks-can-turn-the-kyc-
compliance-challenge-into-a-competitive-advantage > accessed on 15 July 2019 
 
67. Ross S, Hannan M, ‘Money laundering regulation and risk‐based decision-making’ (2007) 10(1) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 106 
 
68. Stanley L R and Buckley P R, ‘Protecting the West, Excluding the Rest: The Impact of the AML/CTF 
Regime on Financial Inclusion in the Pacific and Potential Responses’ (2016) 17 Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 83 
 
69. Sharman C J, ‘Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money Laundering in Developing 
States’ (2008) 52(3) International Studies Quarterly Journal 635 
   
70. Sagastume Z W, Moreno-Brid C J and Garry S, ‘Money Laundering and Financial Risk 
Management in Latin America, with Special Reference to Mexico’ (2016) 44 < 
http://economiatyp.uam.mx/index.php/ETYP/article/view/238/343> accessed 30 August 2019 
 
71. Simonova A, ‘The risk‐based approach to anti‐money laundering: problems and solutions’ (2011) 14 
(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 346 
 
72. Sathye M & Islam J, ‘Adopting a risk-based approach to AMLCTF compliance: the Australian case 
(2011) 18(2) Journal of Financial Crime 169 
 
73. Sam S, ‘Coping with the FSA’s risk-based approach’ (2005) 13(1) Journal of Financial Regulation 
and Compliance 43 
 
74. Solomon I, Trotman T K, ‘Experimental judgment and decision research in auditing: the first 25 
years of AOS’ (2003) 28(4) Accounting, Organizations and Society 395 
 
75. Saunders F, ‘Differentiating between Risk and Uncertainty in the Project Management Literature’ 
(2016) The University of Manchester < http://fionasaunders.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Differentiating-between-Risk-and-Uncertainty-in-the-Project-Management-
Literature.pdf> accessed 20 July 2019 
 
76. Stanley L R and Buckley P R, ‘Protecting the West, Excluding the Rest: The Impact of the AML/CTF 
Regime on Financial Inclusion in the Pacific and Potential Responses’ (2016) 17 Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 83 
77. Takats F, ‘A Theory of "Crying Wolf": The Economics of Money Laundering Enforcement’ (2011) 
27(1) Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 32 
 
78. Ullrich C, ‘A risk-based approach towards infringements prevention on the internet: adopting the 
anti-money laundering framework to online platforms’ (2018) 26 (3) International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology 226 
 
79. Weeks-Brown R, ‘cleaning up Countries are advancing efforts to stop criminals from laundering their 
trillions’ (International monetary funds, 2018) 55 (4) finance and Development department 44 < 
https//www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/12/imf-anti-money-laundering-and-economic-
stability-straight.htm > accessed 28 July 2019 
 
 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
80 Basel Institute on Governance, A country ranking and review of money laundering and terrorist financing 
risks around the world (Basel AML Index, 2019) International Centre for Asset Recovery 6 < 
Page 77 of 80 
 
https//www.baselgovernance.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Basel%20AML%20Index%202019.pdf> 
accessed 11 September 2019 
 
81 Baars D, ‘Towards Self-Sovereign Identity using Blockchain Technology’ (2017) < 
https://essay.utwente.nl/71274/1/Baars_MA_BMS.pdf> accessed 16 July 2019 
 
82 Chohan W U, ‘The FATF in the Global Financial Architecture: Challenges and Implications’ (2019) Centre 
for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS) Paper EC001UC < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3362167&download=yes> accessed 29 June 2019 
 
83 Edmonds T, ‘Bank accounts: problems of identification’ (House of common library, briefing paper 03366, 
2017) 
 
84 Gelb A, ‘Balancing Financial Integrity with Financial Inclusion: The Risk-Based Approach to “Know Your 
Customer’ (2016) Centre for Global Development, Washington DC, CDG Policy paper 074 < 
https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-Policy-Paper-Gelb-KYC-Financial-Incl.pdf> accessed on 16 
July 2019 
 
85 Holzer B and Millo Y, London School of Economics and Political Science ‘From risks to second-order 
dangers in financial markets: unintended consequences of risk management systems’ (Centre for 
Analysis of Risk and Regulation, CARR Discussion Papers (DP 29) 2004) 
 
86 International Centre for Asset Recovery, ‘Basel AML Index Report’ (Basel Institute of Governance, 2018) 
< https://www.baselgovernance.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/basel_aml_index_10_09_2018.pdf> 
accesses 21 July 2019 
 
87 Muppayyanamath V, ‘Anti-Money Laundering: Challenges and Trends’ (White paper, Tata Consultancy 
Services, 2017) < 
https://www.tcs.com/content/dam/tcs/pdf/Industries/Banking%20and%20Financial%20Services/Anti-
Money%20Laundering%20-%20Challenges%20and%20trends.pdf> accessed 5 August 2019 
 
88 Watt C T, ‘Money Laundering Watch Former Guinean Minister of Mines Sentenced to Seven Years in 
Prison for Laundering $8.5 Million in Bribes Paid by Chinese Companies in Exchange for Mining Rights’ 
(Ballard Spahe LLP, 30 August 2017) < https//www.moneylaunderingnews.com/2017/08/former-guinean-
minister-mines-sentenced-seven-years-prison-laundering-8-5-million-bribes-paid-chinese-companies-
exchange-mining-rights/> accessed 28 July 2019 
 
 
  
OTHER ELECTRONIC SOURCES 
 
89. Afsar H, ‘Personal liability or talent drain’ (ACAMS, 9 May 2016) < 
https://www.acamstoday.org/personal-liability-or-talent-drain/> accessed 10 September 2019 
 
90. Boehmer B, ‘Reporting Suspicious Activity to the NCA – the latest case of Lonsdale v. Nat West Bank’ 
(Lockton, 08 February 2019) < https://www.locktonsolicitors.co.uk/news/reporting-suspicious-activity-
to-the-nca-the-latest-case-of-lonsdale-v-nat-west-bank.html> accessed 15 August 2019 
 
91. Binham C, ‘UK Money Laundering Reports hit record level in 2018’ Financial Times (London, 10 
January 2019) 
 
92. Cuthbertson A, ‘How children playing Fortnite are helping to fuel organized crime’ The independence 
(London, 13 January 2019) 
 
93. Debevoise In Depth, ‘2018/2019 Anti-Money Laundering Review and Outlook’ (Debevoise & Plimpton 
LLP, 5 February 2019) < 20190205_2018_Anti_Money_Laundering_Review_and_Outlook (3).pdf > 
accessed 5 August 2019 
 
94. Danko J, ‘The effectiveness of suspicious Activity Reports’ (ORACLE, 16 February 2018) < 
https://blogs.oracle.com/financialservices/the-effectiveness-of-suspicious-activity-re> accessed 15 
August 2019 
 
95. ‘DFSA Takes Action Against Hany Lotfy Awwad Abdelwahab’ (Dubai Financial Service Authority, 22 
April 2015) < https://www.dfsa.ae/News/News-Detail/DFSA-Takes-Action-Against-Hany-Lotfy-Awwad-
Abdelwa> accessed 15 September 2019 
96. English S and Harmmond S, ‘ Cost of Compliance’ (Thomson Reuters, 2015) < 
https://www.cover.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Cost_of_Compliance_2015-6.pdf> accessed 16 
July 2019 
 
97. (esri Terrorist attacks, 30 July 2019 < https://storymaps.esri.com/stories/terrorist-attacks/> accessed 30 
July 2019 
 
Page 78 of 80 
 
98. FATF, ‘All Publications: FATF Risk Based Approach Guidance’ < https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/?hf=10&b=0&q=guidance&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> accessed 30 July 2019 
 
99. FATF ‘Consolidated mutual evaluation report published and country specific reports (As of 3 
September 2019) < https//www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> accessed 10 
September 2019 
 
100. FATF, ‘What we do’ < https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/whatwedo/> accessed 29 June 2019 
 
101. FATF, ‘Designated categories of offence’ <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/glossary/d-i/> accessed 1 
September 2019 
 
102. FATF, ‘History of FATF’ < https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/> accessed 29 June 2019 
 
103. FATF, ‘IX special recommendation’ < https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/ixspecialrecommendations.html> accessed 30 
August 2019 
 
104. FATF, ‘Who we are’ < https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ > accessed 29 June 2019 
 
105. FATF, ‘Members and observers’ < https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/> accessed 
29 June 2019 
 
106. FATF, ‘FATF Countries’ < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/> accessed 30 June 2019 
 
107. FATF, ‘Remarks by FATF President Marshall Billingslea’ < https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/speech-fatf-ministerial.html> accessed 30 June 2019 
 
108. ‘FinCEN Final Rule: New Customer Due Diligence Requirements’ (Trulioo, 9 January 2019) < 
https://www.trulioo.com/blog/fincen-final-cdd-rule/ > accessed 15 July 2019 
 
109. ‘FCA fines Standard Chartered Bank £102.2 million for poor AML controls’ (Financial Conduct 
Authority, 9 April 2019) <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-fines-standard-chartered-
bank-102-2-million-poor-aml-controls> accessed 30 July 2019 
 
110. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, ‘Bank Secrecy Act/ Anti-Money Laundering 
Examination Manual (2014) < https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-
publications-reports/ffiec-bsa-aml-examination-manual.pdf> accessed 17 July 2019 
 
111. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Bank Secrecy Act Anti-Money Laundering 
Examination Manual (2014) < https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/docs/manual/01_Introduction/01.pdf > accessed 
10 August 2019 
 
112. Fenergo, ‘Global Financial Institutions Fined $26 Billion for AML, Sanctions & KYC Non-Compliance’ 
(Dublin, Ireland, 26 September 2018) < https://www.fenergo.com/press-releases/global-financial-
institutions-fined-$26-billion-for-aml-kyc.html> accessed on 5 August 2019 
 
113. ‘Global Financial Institutions Fined $26 Billion for AML, Sanctions & KYC Non-Compliance Since 2008 
Financial Crisis’ (The fintech times, 27 September 2018) < https://thefintechtimes.com/institutions-
fined-26-billion-non-compliance-since-2008/ > accessed 29 July 2019 
 
114. ‘GDT Global Terrorist Database’ Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables’ (START, July 2018) < 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf> accessed 30 July 2019 
 
115. Haring L, ‘What are the Panama Papers? A guide to history’s biggest data leak’ The Guardian 
(London, 5 April 2016) 
 
116. Hudak S, ‘FinCEN and Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announce Settlement with Former MoneyGram 
Executive Thomas E. Haider’ (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 4 May 2017) < 
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-and-manhattan-us-attorney-announce-settlement-
former-moneygram-executive > accessed 15 September 2019 
 
117. Hope B, Drew Hinshaw and Patricia Kowsmann, ‘How One Stubborn Banker Exposed a $200 Billion 
Russian Money-Laundering Scandal’ (The Wall Street Journal, 23 Octobe r2018) < 
https//www.wsj.com/articles/how-one-stubborn-banker-exposed-a-200-billion-russian-money-
laundering-scandal-1540307327> accessed 28 July 2019 
 
118. HM Treasury, ‘Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation guidance < 
https//assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2920
95/fin_sanc_consolidated_list_format_guide.pdf > accessed on 17 July 2019 
 
119. HM Treasury, ‘Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation guidance < 
https//www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-consolidated-list-of-targets > accessed 
on 17 July 2019 
Page 79 of 80 
 
120. HM Treasury, ‘Office of Financial Sanctions implementation’ (10 July 2019) < http//hmt-
sanctions.s3.amazonaws.com/sanctionsconlist.pdf > accessed on 17 July 2019 
 
121. International Monetary Funds, PANAMA selected issues (IMF Country Report No. 19/12) < Panama: 
Selected Issues; IMF Country Report No. 19/12; November 21, 2018 > accessed 30 August 2019 
 
122. International Monetary Fund, ‘Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
(AML/CFT)’ < https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml1.htm#moneylaundering> accessed 
20 July 2019 
 
123. Jeffery C, ‘Criminals are laundering money through kids playing Fortnite’ (Techspot, 23 January 2019) 
< https://www.techspot.com/community/topics/criminals-are-laundering-money-through-kids-playing-
fortnite.251551/> accessed 20 July 2019 
 
124. Lewis D, ‘Counter-Terrorism Financing Summit’ (Bangkok, 8 November 2018) < https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/speech-cft-conference-nov-2018.html > accessed 29 June 
2019 
 
125. Mufson S and McGee J, ‘BCCI scandal: behind the 'bank of crooks and criminals'’ The Washington 
post (Washington, 28 July 1991) 
 
126. Miller E and Kammerer W, ‘Global Terrorism in 2017’ (University of Maryland, August 2018) 
<https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_GTD_Overview2017_July2018.pdf> accessed 30 July 2019 
 
127. Mangnusson N, ‘Days of Fear and Surprise as Nordic Laundering Scandal Widened’ (Bloomberg, 29 
March 2019) < https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-29/days-of-fear-and-surprise-as-
nordic-laundering-scandal-widened > accessed 01 August 2019 
 
128. Merle R, ‘Democracy Dies in Darkness CEO of Denmark bank quits amid an alleged $233 billion 
money-laundering investigation, (The Washing Post, 19 September 2018) < 
https//www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/09/19/ceo-denmark-bank-quits-amid-an-alleged-billion-
money-laundering-investigation/?utm_term=.8ac545f23d9c> accessed 28 July 2019 
 
129. Murphy M, ‘Managing regulatory data for faster compliance and client onboarding’ (Bobs guide, 10 
May 2017) < https://www.bobsguide.com/guide/news/2017/May/10/managing-regulatory-data-for-
faster-compliance-and-client-onboarding/ > accessed 10 September 2019 
 
130. My KYC Bank, Know your customer: Direct ownership and ultimate Beneficial Ownership < 
https://www.mykycbank.com/Downloads/UBO%20Description.pdf> accessed 16 July 2019 
 
131. Neate R and Rankin J, ‘Danske Bank money laundering 'is biggest scandal in Europe': Unpleasant 
lesson of €200bn case shows need to be vigilant – European commission’ The guardian (London, 20 
September 2018) 
 
132. Neale D, ‘Taking stock of 2018’s money laundering scandals: When is enough enough? (Part 1)’  
(Global Financial Integrity, 6 January 201) < https://gfintegrity.org/taking-stock-of-2018-part-1/> 
accessed 10 September 2019 
 
133. Neale D, ‘Taking stock of 2018’s money laundering scandals: When is enough enough? (Part 2)’  
(Global Financial Integrity, 9 January 201) < https://gfintegrity.org/taking-stock-of-2018-part-2/> 
accessed 10 September 2019 
 
134. National Crime Agency, ‘Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2018’ (2018) 
<https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/256-2018-sars-annual-report/file> 
accessed 20 August 2019 
 
135. Norhausen V, ‘The Battle Against Money Laundering’ (Checkout.com, 19 March 2019) < 
https://www.checkout.com/company/blog/post/the-battle-against-money-laundering> accessed 06 September 2019 
 
136. Obermayer B, Frederik Obermaier, Vanessa Wormer and Wolfgang Jaschensky, ‘The secrete of dirty 
money: Theses are panama papers’ < 
https://panamapapers.sueddeutsche.de/articles/56ff9a28a1bb8d3c3495ae13/ > accessed on 15 July 
2019 
 
137. OECD: What is the CRS? < https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/common-reporting-
standard/> accessed 15 July 2019 
 
138. PWC, ‘Financial Crime Guidance 2018 An evolving Regulatory Landscape (2018) < 
https//www.pwc.co.uk/services/forensic-services/financial-crime/our-insights/financial-crime-guide-tool-
and-global-financial-crime-resource-m.html > accessed 29 July 2019 
 
139. Peters G and Vishnia G, ‘Blockchain Architectures for Electronic Exchange Reporting Requirements 
EMIR, Dodd Frank, MiFID I/II, MiFIR, REMIT, Reg NMS and T2S’ (2016) < 
https//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2832604&download=yes> accessed 17 July 2019 
 
Page 80 of 80 
 
140. Pinchas, FCA fines for Non-Compliance with its record-keeping requirements’ (Tele Massage, 29 
January 2018) < https://www.telemessage.com/fca-fines-non-compliance-recordkeeping-
requirements/> accessed 16 July 2019) 
 
141. Ruuda L, ‘Bank suspected of money laundering was closed down overnight’ Postimees (Estonin, 27 
March 2018) 
 
142. Reuters T, ‘Thomson Reuters 2017 Global KYC Surveys Attest to Even Greater Compliance Pain 
Points’ (Thomson, 26 October 2017) < https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/press-
releases/2017/october/thomson-reuters-2017-global-kyc-surveys-attest-to-even-greater-compliance-
pain-points.html> accessed 16 July 2019 
 
143. Refinitiv, ‘KYC compliance - the rising challenge for corporates (2017) < 
https://www.refinitiv.com/en/resources/special-report/kyc-compliance-the-rising-challenge-for-
corporates/> accessed 16 July 2019 
 
144. Rupert, ‘Danske Bank chief resigns over €200bn money-laundering scandal: Thomas Borgen admits 
most of £180bn that passed through Estonian branch was fraudulent’ (London, 20 September 2018) 
 
145. Stevenson W R, ‘Breaking the Bank -- A special report; Big Gambles, Lost Bets Sank a Venerable 
Firm’ The New York Times (New York, 3 March 1995) 
 
146. Stumbaur S, ‘As recent money-laundering scandals move from the Baltics to Scandinavia, who will be 
next?’ (International Banker, 19 June 2019) < https://internationalbanker.com/finance/the-end-of-
european-money-laundering-scandals-or-just-the-beginning/> accessed 01 August 2019 
 
147. ‘Swiss bank UBS faces French court ruling on fraud charges’ Malaymail (Malaysia, 20 February 2019) 
 
148. ‘SFC reprimands and fines Hung Lai Ping for managerial and supervisory failures’ (Securities and 
Future Commission, 19 May 2014) < https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-
announcements/news/enforcement-news/doc?refNo=14PR102> accessed 15 September 2019 
 
149. ‘Three years after the Panama Papers: Progress on Horizon’ (Transparency International, 4 April 2019 
< 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/three_years_after_the_panama_papers_progress_on_hori
zon accessed 14 September 2019 
 
150. United Nations Security Council, ‘United Nation Security Council consolidated list < 
https//scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resource
s/xsl/en/consolidated.xsl accessed 17 July 2019 
 
151. Usmani F, ‘Risk Vs Uncertainty in project management’ (PM Study Circle, 24 July 2019) < 
https://pmstudycircle.com/2012/02/risk-vs-uncertain> accessed  01 August 2019 
 
152. ‘Will Terrorism continue to decline in 2019?’ (The conversation, 27 February 2019) < 
https://theconversation.com/will-terrorism-continue-to-decline-in-2019-104466> accessed 29 July 2019 
 
153. William & Mary, ‘Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC)’ <  
https://www.wm.edu/offices/techtransfer/ExportControls/Regulations/OFAC/index.php> accessed 17 
July 2019 
 
154. Young M, ‘Short the Bankers: Another major bank ordered closed for money Laundering’ (News BTC, 
6 September 2019) < https://www.newsbtc.com/2019/02/20/short-the-bankers-another-major-bank-
ordered-closed-for-money-laundering/> accessed 06 September 2019 
 
 
 
 
